Imp. Rulings - Acquiescence, Approbate and Reprobate

 Imp. Rulings - Acquiescence, Approbate and Reprobate

Index; 

1. SCI (2026.05.17)  in Sanjay Dave Vs. Andhra Bank Ltd. and Ors. [2026 INSC 580, (2026) ibclaw.in 401 SC, Civil Appeal Nos. 12264-12266 of 2024]

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SCI (2026.05.17)  in Sanjay Dave Vs. Andhra Bank Ltd. and Ors. [2026 INSC 580, (2026) ibclaw.in 401 SC, Civil Appeal Nos. 12264-12266 of 2024] held that;-

# 27. Dealing with the meaning of “acquiescence”, this Court in Chairman, State Bank of India and Another v. M.J. James1, held as under:

• “39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence.”

• (Emphasis supplied)

# 28. The appellant cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate. In the celebrated case of Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao and Others2, this Court held as under:

• “9.15. The observations of Scrutton, L.J. on which the appellants rely are as follows: (Verschures Creameries, KB pp. 611-12)

• “… A plaintiff is not permitted to “approbate and reprobate”. The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election — namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument: Ker v. Wauchope; Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby. The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction.”

# 29. Further, in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation and Another. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited and Another3, it was held:

• “I. Approbate and reprobate

• 15. A party cannot be permitted to “blow hot-blow cold”, “fast and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an order, he is estopped from denying the validity of, or the binding effect of such contract, or conveyance, or order upon himself. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a manner so as to violate the principles of what is right and of good conscience.

• 16. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel—the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had.”

• (Emphasis supplied)

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