V. Chandrasekhar Naidu Vs. E. Muneendra & Ors. - In this regard, we place our reliance on the well-entrenched principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings. This Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage at the behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate the issues arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the parties.

 HC Andhra Pradesh  (2026.06.18) in  V. Chandrasekhar Naidu Vs. E. Muneendra & Ors.  [APHC010287242026, Writ Appeal No. 684 of 2026 ] held that;

• This view is contrary to the settled law that a question, which did not form part of the pleadings or in respect of which the parties were not at variance and which was not the subject-matter of any issue, could not be decided by the court.

• Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ.

• In this regard, we place our reliance on the well-entrenched principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings. This Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage at the behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate the issues arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the parties."

Excerpts of the Order; 

Heard Sri Kondaparthy Kiran Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant appearing through virtual mode, Ms. Maheswari Arika, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 7, and the learned Government Pleader for Revenue for respondent Nos.8, 10, 12 & 13.

# 2. This writ appeal has been filed by the appellant/respondent No.7 (in the writ petition), aggrieved by the order dated 08.05.2026 passed in W.P.No.14219 of 2026, whereby the learned Single Judge directed the parties to maintain status quo, as on the date of the order, with regard to the subject land, with respect to the mutation of the names of the parties concerned for the subject land.

# 3. Respondent Nos.1 to 7 herein are the writ petitioners in W.P.No.14219 of 2026. The appellant herein is respondent No.7 and respondent Nos.8 to 13 herein are the official respondents.

# 4. The dispute between the appellant and the writ petitioners pertains to the subject land i.e., to an extent of Ac.2.48 cents in Sy.No.243/3, situated at Cherlopalle Village, Tirupati Rural Mandal, Tirupati District (erstwhile Chittoor District).

# 5. The case of the writ petitioners was that the subject land was assigned in favour of the writ petitioners' grandfather and he remained in possession and enjoyment thereof which was also so recorded in the revenue records. The Urban Development Authority issued notice dated 27.02.1987 under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and called for the objections and after submission of the objections, the proceedings were withdrawn in the year 1987. It is their further case that the petitioners' grandfather nor his sons transferred the subject land to anyone. However, respondent No.7 in writ petition claimed that his father had purchased the land from the petitioners' grandfather/his legal heirs. Respondent No.6 in the writ petition passed the order of resumption on 16.08.1987 on the ground of violation of the terms and conditions of the assignment which was challenged by the father of respondent No.7 in writ petition No.12556 of 1999 which was disposed of with the direction to the Tahsildar concerned to reconsider the issue with reference to Section 3(5) of the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfer) Act, 1977. After enquiry an order was passed in favour of the father of respondent No.7 on 13.11.1990 but after his death again the proposal for resumption of the land was initiated on the ground that the land use was changed, into non-agricultural, for the setting up a brick kiln. The order of resumption was passed on 19.06.2006, which was challenged in appeal. The appeal was allowed. The resumption order was set aside on 15.03.2008 by RDO but this order was again set aside in revision on 30.10.2009 by the Joint Collector, with direction to resume the land as per the Rules and to make necessary changes in the revenue records. Respondent No.7 in writ petition, filed W.P.No.26503 of 2009 which was allowed on 03.02.2020 by setting aside the order dated 30.10.2009. Challenging the order dated 03.02.2020 two writ appeal Nos.373 and 572 of 2021 were filed, which were dismissed confirming the order passed in Writ Petition.

# 6. Petitioners further case is that respondent No.7 in writ petition without approaching the competent civil court made representation dated 19.05.2025 before the Joint Collector for deletion of the land from prohibited properties list under Section 22A of the Registration Act, 1908 for the land to the disputed extent, which was allowed vide order dated 19.02.2026 deleting the land from the prohibited property list. The writ petitioners' case is that, the order dated 19.02.2026 was passed without notice to them. Challenging the order dated 19.02.2026, the writ petitioners filed appeal along with stay application on 15.04.2026 and the same is pending adjudication before the appellate authority. Their further case is that in the meantime, the entry in revenue records was changed to certain extent of an area, and the petitioners' possession was being attempted to be disturbed by their dispossession/eviction without following due process of law. So they filed the writ petition for direction to the respondents in the writ petition not to evict/dispossess the petitioners from the subject land pending the statutory appeal.

# 7. The learned Single Judge, by order dated 08.05.2026, disposed of the writ petition No.14219 of 2026, inter alia, directing the appellate authority to consider and dispose of the statutory appeal strictly in accordance with law, by hearing all the parties concerned and upon verification of the record and the subject land within the period stipulated. The operative part reads as under :

• "6. In view of the above said facts and circumstances, since the appeal is pending before the 2nd respondent, it is just and necessary to dispose of the same in accordance with law to meet the ends of justice. For the said purpose, the 2nd respondent is directed to consider and dispose of the appeal of the petitioners dated 15.04.2026 strictly in accordance with law by hearing all the parties concerned including the petitioners and the 7th respondent herein, upon verification of the records and the subject land, appropriate decision shall be taken on its own merits as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of four (4) months from the date of receipt of this order. In the meanwhile, there shall be an order of status quo as on today to be maintained with respect to the mutation of the names of the parties concerned for the subject land covered under the, said appeal.

• 7. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. Interim order, if any, deemed to have been vacated. There shall be no order as to costs."

# 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that so far as the direction to the statutory appellate authority to dispose of the appeal is concerned, the appellant has no grievance which is confined only to that part of the order whereby the parties have been directed to maintain status quo as on the date of the order, with regard to the mutation in respect of the subject land. He submits that in the writ petition there was no challenge on the point of mutation of entries and no relief was sought in that regard. The only relief claimed in the writ petition was with respect to the alleged possession and dispossession from the subject land during the pendency of the statutory appeal before the respondent No.2. Learned counsel submits that such a direction in the judgment under appeal is beyond the scope of the relief sought in the writ petition. He places reliance in State of Himachal Pradesh and Others v. Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh [(2011) 6 SCC 597].

# 9. Learned counsel for the writ appellant/7th respondent in writ petition further submits that the mutation of the name of the appellant had already taken place in respect of an extent of Ac.1.65 cents out of the total extent of Ac.2.48 cents of the subject land.

# 10. Learned counsel for the writ appellant further submits that the appellant has already instituted O.S. No.47 of 2026 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tirupati, against the writ petitioners (defendants in the suit), in which, the learned Civil Judge, by order dated 21.04.2026, has granted an ad interim temporary injunction to the effect, "accordingly ad-interim injunction is granted in favour of the petitioner against the respondents from restraining them not to interfere with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff's over the petition schedule property by dispensing the notice to them" which also finds mention in paragraph No.5 of the impugned judgment. If the writ petitioners are aggrieved from the grant of the ad interim injunction, they should take recourse to the remedy open to them under law.

# 11. Learned counsel for the write petitioners/respondent Nos.1 to 7 in writ appeal, submits that, pursuant to the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition, the statutory appeal is required to be decided expeditiously so, the direction to maintain status quo with respect to the mutation entries in the revenue records is justified and calls for no interference.

# 12. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 7 further submits that respondent Nos.1 to 7 were not served with the notice of the suit proceedings. The ad interim temporary injunction is ex parte. They came to know about the said order in the course of the writ proceedings and they are taking steps to enter appearance and take appropriate steps before the learned trial Court in the suit proceedings. However, the writ appellant is attempting to dispossess the writ petitioners from the subject land and in such a case, irreparable injury would be caused to the petitioners/respondent Nos.1 to 7.

# 13. We have considered the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.

# 14. Insofar as the direction issued by the learned Single Judge for expeditious disposal of the pending statutory appeal is concerned, learned counsels for both the sides have no grievance.

# 15. The grievance of the writ appellant is with respect to the direction to maintain status quo in relation to the mutation entries.

# 16. We find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. The relief sought in the writ petition did not pertain to the mutation entries in the revenue records, but was with respect to the alleged attempt of the respondent Nos.5 and 6 in writ petition to dispossess the writ petitioners from the subject land, without following due process of law.

# 17. The prayer in writ petition reads as under:

• ".....to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondents in trying to dispossess the petitioners from the land to an extent of Ac. 2.48 cents in No.243/3 of Cherlopalle Village, Tirupati Rural Mandal, Tirupati District, (erstwhile Chittoor District) pending appeal dated 15.04.2026 before the 2nd Respondent as illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional against the principles of natural justice and consequently direct the Respondents not evict/dispossess the Petitioners from the land to an extent of Ac. 2.48 cents in Sy.No.243/3 of Cherlopalle Village, Tirupati Rural Mandal, Tirupati District, (erstwhile Chittoor District) pending appeal dated 15.04.2026 before the 2nd Respondent and to pass....."

# 18. The writ petition did not contain any prayer with respect to the mutation entries. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 7 could not dispute that there was any prayer in the writ petition with respect to the mutation entries. In State of Himachal Pradesh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held at paragraph No.17, as follows:

• "17. We have already adverted to the relief prayed for by the respondent Association in the said writ petition. Admittedly, there is no prayer for quashing of even earlier Cabinet decision or order of the Government. The conclusion of the High Court quashing the Cabinet decision dated 18-7-2009 and as a consequence issuing several directions is unacceptable and contrary to the well- established principles. First of all, there was no prayer for quashing of any decision of the State Government much less the subsequent Cabinet decision dated 18-7-2009. If the High Court was interested in going into the said decision that too after reserving the judgment on 3-7-2009, it is but appropriate to reopen the case, permit the petitioner Association to amend the relief portion and afford adequate opportunity to the State to put forth its stand for modifying this "policy" curtailing certain courses under SCVT. Admittedly, the High Court has not resorted to such a recourse and simply quashed the decision of the Cabinet dated 18-7-2009 and issued various directions which are impermissible."

# 19. The settled legal proposition, therefore, is that a Court ought not to grant a relief which has not been prayed in the writ petition being beyond the scope of the writ petition.

# 20. In Union of India V. E.I.D.Parry (India) Ltd., 2 , the High Court on its own proceeded to consider the validity of the Rule and ultimately held that it was not in consonance with the relevant provisions of the Railways Act,1890 and consequently held that it was ultra vires. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that the view taken by the High Court was contrary to the settled law that a question, which did not form part of the pleadings or in respect of which the parties were not at variance and which was not the subject matter of any issue, could not be decided by the Court. It was further held that the High Court travelled beyond the pleadings in declaring the Rule to be ultra vires. So, the judgment of the High Court could not be sustained. The relevant portion of paragraph No.4 reads as under :

• ".....4. This view is contrary to the settled law that a question, which did not form part of the pleadings or in respect of which the parties were not at variance and which was not the subject-matter of any issue, could not be decided by the court. The scope of the suit was (2000) 2 SCC 223 limited. The pleadings comprising of the averments set out in the plaint and the defence put up by the present appellant in their written statement did not relate to the validity of the rule struck down by the High Court. The High Court, therefore, travelled beyond the pleadings in declaring the rule to be ultra vires. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, on this question cannot be sustained."

# 21. In State of Orissa and another V. Mamata Mohanty3, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the relief not claimed could not have been granted. The relevant paragraph No.55 reads as under:

• "Relief not claimed--cannot be granted

• 55. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a settled legal proposition that "as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted". Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. [Vide Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho [(1897-98) 25 (2011) 3 SCC 436 IA 195 (PC)] , Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar [(1953) 1 SCC 456 : AIR 1953 SC 235] , Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (L.A.) [(2005) 7 SCC 190 : AIR 2005 SC 3165] and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. [(2010) 4 SCC 518 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 207] ]"

# 22. Recently in Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar and Others V. Union of India and Others [2025 SCC Online 2064] the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is settled principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not found in the pleadings. The relevant paragraph No.18 reads as under :

• "18. In this regard, we place our reliance on the well-entrenched principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings. This Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage at the behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate the issues arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the parties."

# 23. We find that the writ petition did not contain any prayer relating to the mutation entries nor a prayer for maintaining status quo with respect to the mutation entries pending disposal of the statutory appeal.

# 24. Consequently, we are of the view that the part of the judgment pertaining to the directions issued by the learned single Judge to maintain status quo in respect of the mutation entries cannot be legally sustained. The same is accordingly, set aside to that extent.

# 25. However that is not the end of the matter. The fact remains that the prayer made in the writ petition has not been considered, regarding threat of alleged dispossession by not following the due process of law, in correct perspective.

# 26. The question as to which of the parties is in possession of the subject property and whether there is any attempt for illegal dispossession are matters which are directly in issue in the pending civil suit. It is not in dispute that the competent Civil Court has already granted an ad interim temporary injunction restraining the defendants therein, (the present respondents 1 to 7), and that notice has also been issued in the suit proceedings. Once the dispute is in the civil suit, the parties are required to work out their remedies before the learned trial Court. If the respondents 1 to 7 (writ petitioners) are aggrieved by the ad interim order of injunction or they intend to seek any further interim protection, it is open to them to approach the learned trial Court by filing an appropriate application in the suit or/and to institute the suit; whichever remedy may be available and as may be advised to them.

# 27. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the writ petitioners had no knowledge of the ad interim temporary injunction order passed in the suit, while filing the writ petition. Learned counsel for the writ appellant disputes and contends that they had the knowledge. We refrain from expressing any views on the said disputed question of fact.

# 28. Having regard to the submission advanced by the writ petitioners' counsel that there exists an imminent threat of dispossession of the writ petitioners, and further considering their contention that ad interim temporary injunction was granted in the pending civil suit ex parte and as the writ petitioners are now taking appropriate steps to enter appearance in the suit, we deem it appropriate to protect their interest for a limited period on the principle that no one can be dispossessed except by following due process of law.

# 29. We make it clear that we have not observed nor be understood as observing about the possession or/and alleged attempt of dispossession not by due process of law, in favour of or against any of the parties.

# 30. Accordingly, the writ petitioners shall be at liberty to approach the learned trial Court in an appropriate proceedings within a period of three (03) weeks from today. For the aforesaid period, if the writ petitioners are in possession of the subject property, they shall not be dispossessed except by due process of law.

# 31. It is further made clear that this order shall not preclude the learned trial Court from considering and passing appropriate orders on the applications strictly on its own merits and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations made in this judgment.

# 32. The statutory appellate authority shall also proceed and dispose of the pending statutory appeal expeditiously, in terms of the direction issued by the learned Single Judge for expeditious disposal.

# 33. With the above observations and directions, the Writ Appeal is allowed in part.

No order as to costs.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed.

---------------------------------------------------------

Rajat Kumar & Ors vs S D Adarash Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura & Ors - There being no prayer made by the original plaintiff in the suit for grant of any compensation nor any consent having been offered by the legal heirs of the plaintiff in that regard, the High Court could not have imposed such a direction on them, especially when there was a decree operating in their favour.

 SCI (2026.05.04) in Rajat Kumar & Ors vs S D Adarash Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura & Ors. [2026 INSC 648, Civil Appeal Nos.19552-19553 OF 2017 ] held that;

• Indeed, the course adopted by the High Court does not find support under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

• There being no prayer made by the original plaintiff in the suit for grant of any compensation nor any consent having been offered by the legal heirs of the plaintiff in that regard, the High Court could not have imposed such a direction on them, especially when there was a decree operating in their favour.

• The legal heirs of the plaintiff have been required to accept monetary relief for which a prayer was never made. Such course has resulted in miscarriage of justice.

Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. The appellants are the legal heirs of the original plaintiff- Om Parkash. The original plaintiff filed Civil Suit No.426 of 1996 against the respondents-original defendants seeking mandatory injunction for removal of alleged illegal encroachment in the form of a wall constructed by them on the common open space beyond the plaintiff’s house. He further sought permanent injunction seeking to restrain the defendants from raising any further construction thereon. 

Trial Court on 06.02.2006 decreed the suit and directed the defendants to remove the encroachment committed by raising the said walls. It also restrained them from raising any further construction over the said walls.

Regular Civil Appeal No.137 of 2006 preferred by the defendants was dismissed on 05.09.2007 and the decree passed by the Trial Court was upheld.

The defendants being aggrieved preferred Regular Second Appeal No.364 of 2008 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court1. By the judgment dated 25.11.2011, the High Court disposed the Second Appeal with a direction to the defendants to pay an amount of ₹10,000/- with interest @ 12% per annum being half the amount of expenditure incurred on construction of the walls in question. It further held that on making such payment, the wall would be treated as ‘common’ between the parties. The legal heirs of the plaintiff challenged the reversal of the decree before this Court, reference to which would be made a bit later. 

# 2. The original plaintiff also filed another Civil Suit being CS No.148 of 2000 against the same defendants, this time with a prayer for mandatory injunction for removal of lintel of the school building that had been erected by the defendants on the wall of the plaintiff’s house. The Trial Court by its judgment dated 08.11.2004 decreed the said suit and directed the defendants to remove the lintel of the school building from the said wall. The defendants were also restrained from putting any lintel on any wall of the plaintiff’s house.

Being aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.143 of 2004 which came to be dismissed by the first Appellate Court on 05.09.2007. Being aggrieved, the defendants preferred Regular Second Appeal No.363 of 2008 before the High Court. The Second Appeal was decided on 25.11.2011 and a similar decree directing the defendants to pay an amount of ₹7,000/- being half of the amount spent on construction of the wall with interest @ 12% per annum was passed. It was further directed that on making such payment, the wall would be treated as ‘common’ between the parties.

# 3. The legal heirs of the original plaintiff being aggrieved by the reversal of the aforesaid decrees by the High Court filed appeals before this Court. By order dated 13.09.2013 passed in Civil Appeal Nos.8203 of 2013 and 8281 of 2013, it was held that the modification of the decrees by the High Court without entering into the merits of the controversy was impermissible. No substantial questions of law had been framed while deciding the Second Appeals. On these counts, the judgments delivered in the Second Appeals by the High Court were set aside and the proceedings were remanded for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

# 4. On remand, the High Court was of the view that the construction of the wall had been raised long back. There was no valuation report on record and the claim alleged to be put forth by the plaintiff had not been proved. By observing that the other party could be compensated in terms of money that could be assessed by a valuer and with a view to do justice between the parties, it directed the Executing Court to assess the value of the construction. The defendants were accordingly directed to deposit such amount in the Executing Court to be paid to the legal heirs of the plaintiff. With these directions, the decree passed by the Trial Court as affirmed by the first Appellate Court came to be set aside.

The legal heirs of the original plaintiff are aggrieved by the reversal of the said decrees and have, thus, preferred the present appeals.

# 5. Despite service, there has been no appearance on behalf of the respondents since 23.04.2019. After hearing Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants and on perusal of the record, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in reversing the decrees passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the first Appellate Court on irrelevant considerations. We say so for the following reasons:

a) The initial suit filed by the original plaintiff was essentially for a decree for mandatory injunction seeking removal of the alleged encroachment undertaken at the behest of the defendants on the common open space beyond the construction of the plaintiff. According to the original plaintiff, such construction interfered with the right of the plaintiff to enjoy air and light through the ventilators as well as obstructed the passing of water through the common path.

It found that the defendants could not prove any right, title or interest on the land on which they had erected the wall. The decree was, thus, passed to remove the wall illegally erected by them. In the other suit, the Trial Court found that the defendants had put up a lintel of the school building on the wall of the plaintiff’s house illegally. A decree directing removal of the same and restraining the defendants from doing so in the future was passed. Both these decrees were upheld by the first Appellate Court. There was no prayer whatsoever made by the original plaintiff seeking any damages or compensation from the defendants for the encroachment committed by them. In absence of any such relief sought by the original plaintiff, the decree passed in his favour could not have been set aside by the High Court by compelling his legal heirs to accept compensation that was directed to be assessed by a valuer. The legal heirs of the plaintiff did not consent for such course to be followed. The High Court, therefore, could not have undertaken such exercise of seeking to compensate one party at the cost of the other without any prayer being made in that regard.

b) The High Court by the impugned judgment reversed the decree for mandatory injunction for removal of encroachment passed by the Trial Court which was upheld by the first Appellate Court. It, however, directed the Executing Court to assess the value of the offending wall put up by the defendants so as to compensate the plaintiff in terms of money. Once the decrees passed by the Trial Court in favour of the plaintiff were set aside, there would be no occasion for the Executing Court to proceed with the execution proceedings since there would be no decree holding the field for being executed. In such a situation, directing the Executing Court to assess the value of the wall in question would be requiring it to undertake an exercise not supported by any decree whatsoever. Indeed, the course adopted by the High Court does not find support under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

c) The High Court ought to have been mindful of the fact that a similar exercise undertaken by it earlier while deciding the respective Second Appeals and directing the payment of For short, ‘the Code’ compensation to the original plaintiff was set aside by this Court. The High Court, on remand however again committed the same error, this time by directing the Executing Court to undertake valuation of the wall in question so as to compensate the legal heirs of the plaintiff in monetary terms. There being no prayer made by the original plaintiff in the suit for grant of any compensation nor any consent having been offered by the legal heirs of the plaintiff in that regard, the High Court could not have imposed such a direction on them, especially when there was a decree operating in their favour.

d) The impugned order of the High Court proceeds on a factually wrong premise that the Trial Court in Civil Suit No.426 of 1996 had recorded a finding that the wall in question was a common wall. No such finding was recorded by the Trial Court. In fact, a decree for removal of the offending wall came to be passed by the Trial Court. Further, though the High Court has referred to three questions in the impugned judgment and has stated that the defendants urged the Court to frame the said questions as ‘substantial questions of law’, the impugned order does not indicate that the said questions were treated as substantial questions of law. However, the order concludes by observing that the substantial questions were answered in favour of the defendants and the decree passed in favour of the original plaintiff was set aside. It is, thus, clear that without an available question of law for consideration and also by making out a new prayer, the decrees passed in favour of the original plaintiff have been set aside. The legal heirs of the plaintiff have been required to accept monetary relief for which a prayer was never made. Such course has resulted in miscarriage of justice.

# 6. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find the judgment of the High Court to be unsustainable. Accordingly, the common judgment dated 02.05.2016 passed in RSA No.363 of 2008 and 364 of 2008 by the High Court is set aside. Since the appeals have not been adjudicated on merits, there is no option but to request the High Court to re-consider both the appeals in accordance with Section 100 of the Code and decide the same on their own merits. Considering the fact that the Second Appeals are of the year 2008, we request the High Court to consider the same expeditiously.

# 7. The Civil Appeals are allowed in aforesaid terms with no order as to costs..

----------------------------------------------

Imp. Rulings - Relief beyond Pleadings

 Imp. Rulings - Relief beyond Pleadings

Index;

1. NCLT Kolkata (2024.02.08) in Urban Infraprojects Private Limited Vs. EDCL Infrastructure Limited  [I.A. (IB) No. 2105/KB/2023 In CP (IB) No. 106/KB/2023]

2. SCI (2008.09.23) in Bachhaj Nahar vs Nilima Mandal & Ors [Civil Appeal Nos.5798-5799 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP ) Nos.23766-67 of 2005]

3. SCI (1987.04.08) in Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) By Lrs Vs Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors  [Civil Appeal No. 638 of 1980.]

---------------------------------------------

1). NCLT Kolkata (2024.02.08) in Urban Infraprojects Private Limited Vs. EDCL Infrastructure Limited  [I.A. (IB) No. 2105/KB/2023 In CP (IB) No. 106/KB/2023] held that;

• # 35. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India vs Ibrahim Uddin reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148, has held that no relief can be granted based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. No party can be permitted to travel beyond its pleading. In other words, it is not a matter of right that an argument made outside the pleadings should be considered. In this context we would refer the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Bishun Narain Inter College and Ors. reported in (1987) 2 SCC 555 that:

• “6.  . . . . . . The question which falls for consideration is whether the respondents in their written statement have raised the necessary pleading that the license was irrevocable as contemplated by Section 60(b) of the Act and, if so, is there any evidence on record to support that plea. It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in  support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet.”

• (Emphasis Added)

• # 36. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 491 held that a case not specifically pleaded can be considered by the court unless the pleadings in substance contain the necessary averments to make out a particular case and issue has been framed on the point. In absence of pleadings, the court cannot make out a case not pleaded, suo motu. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced in verbatim:

• “12. It is thus clear that a case not specifically pleaded can be considered by the court only where the pleadings in substance, though not in specific terms, contains the necessary averments to make out a particular case and the issues framed also generally cover the question involved and the parties proceed on the basis that such case was at issue and had led evidence thereon. As the very requirements indicate, this should be only in exceptional cases where the court is fully satisfied that the pleadings and issues generally cover the case subsequently put forward and that the parties being conscious of the issue, had led evidence on such issue. But where the court is not satisfied that such case was at issue, the question of resorting to the exception to the general rule does not arise. The principles laid down in Bhagwati Prasad and Ram Sarup Gupta (supra) referred to above and several other decisions of this Court following the same cannot be construed as diluting the well settled principle that without pleadings and issues, evidence cannot be considered to make out a new case which is not pleaded. Another aspect to be noticed, is that the court can consider such a case not specifically pleaded, only when one of the parties raises the same at the stage of arguments by contending that the pleadings and issues are sufficient to make out a particular case and that the parties proceeded on that basis and had led evidence on that case. Where neither party puts forth such a contention, the court cannot obviously make out such a case not pleaded, suo moto.”

• (Emphasis Added)

[ Link Synopsis ]

----------------------------------------

2).  SCI (2008.09.23) in Bachhaj Nahar vs Nilima Mandal & Ors [Civil Appeal Nos.5798-5799 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP ) Nos.23766-67 of 2005] held that;.

• The principles laid down in Bhagwati Prasad and Ram Sarup Gupta (supra) referred to above and several other decisions of this Court following the same cannot be construed as diluting the well settled principle that without pleadings and issues, evidence cannot be considered to make out a new case which is not pleaded.

[ Link Synopsis ]

----------------------------------------

3). SCI (1987.04.08) in Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) By Lrs Vs Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors  [Civil Appeal No. 638 of 1980.] held that;.

• The question which falls for consideration is whether the respondents in their written statement have raised the necessary pleading that the license was irrevocable as contemplated by Section 60(b) of the Act and, if so, is there any evidence on record to support that plea. It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and mate- rial facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet.

• To allow one party to reply upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence,  would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another.

[ Link Synopsis ]

---------------------------------------