Monday, 29 June 2026

Imp. Rulings - Allottee’s Right of Interest for Delayed Possession in RERA

  Imp. Rulings - Allottee’s Right of Interest for Delayed Possession in RERA

Index;

  1. HC Bombay (2026.06.08)  in Runwal Constructions Registered Partnership Firm Vs Bharat Shah [2026:BHC-AS:22794, Second Appeal No.251 Of 2022 With Civil Application No. 288 of 2019] [Delayed period interest mandatory]

  2. REAT Punjab (2026.05.25)  in Neeraj Verma & Anr. vs ATS Estates Pvt. Ltd.& Ors. [Complaint No. RERA/ GC No.0171 of 2023] 

  3. REAT Maharashtra (2026.04.27) in CCI Projects Private Limited v. Ramesh Shivsaran Singh & Ors.   [Appeal Nos. AT006-53079 to 53179 of 2021 ] [ Waiver of Interest]

  4. HC Bombay (2025.10.08) in Keyana Estate LLP (Earlier Known as Kiyana Ventures LLP) Vs. Paresh Parihar & Anr.  [2025:BHC-AS:44637,  Second Appeal No. 537 Of 2025 with Interim Application No. 11757 Of 2025] 

  5. UP-REAT (2025.04.01) in Smt. Sushma Shukla Vs. Lucknow Development Authority,  [Appeal No.100 of 2019] [Waiver of delayed period interest]

  6. UP-REAT (2025.04.01) in Sanjeev Aggarwal Vs. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority  [Appeal No.687 of 2022] [Allottee’s demand of interest]

  7. REAT Mumbai (2025.02.24) in Pratibha Fabrics Limited Vs. Macrotech Developers Limited,. [APPEAL NO. AT006000000052817 Of 2021] [Claim after possession]

  8. REAT UP (2024.09.14) in Abha Khanna (IPE) Vs. KVG Realtech Pvt. Ltd. [(2024) ibclaw.in 133 REAT, Appeal No. 243/2020

  9. REAT Mumbai (2024.08.21) in Spenta Builders Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Ashlesh Gosain .[(2024) ibclaw.in 115 REAT, Appeal No. AT00600000052402/20, Appeal No. AT00600000052942/21] [ Interest & compensation]

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i). HC Bombay (2026.06.08)  in Runwal Constructions Registered Partnership Firm Vs Bharat Shah [2026:BHC-AS:22794, Second Appeal No.251 Of 2022 With Civil Application No. 288 of 2019] held that;-

  • The object and reasons of the said Act and the peculiar position of allottees as explained by the Supreme Court to the effect that the buyer borrows money to pay for a house and simultaneously plays the role of a financer as building projects collect money upfront and this puts the buyer in a very vulnerable position i.e. the weakest stakeholder with a high financial exposure clearly shows that the legislative intent to use "shall " in Section 18 of the said Act is to make the same mandatory.

  • Thus it is specifically held by the Supreme Court that the proviso to Section 18(1) contemplates the situation where the allottee does not intend to withdraw from the project, however, there is delay in handing over possession of the apartment. In that case, he is entitled to and must be paid interest for every month's delay till handing over the possession and it is the entire discretion of the allottee either to withdraw from the project and seek refund, interest and compensation or to continue with the project and seek interest for every month's delay in handing over possession.

  • In terms of Section 18 of the RERA Act, if a promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment duly completed by the date specified in the agreement, the promoter would be liable, on demand, to return the amount received by him in respect of that apartment if the allottee wishes to withdraw from the Project. Such right of an allottee is specifically made "without prejudice to any other remedy available to him".

  • Section 18 of the RERA gives unqualified statutory right to the allottees if there is delay in handing over possession by the promoter and if the allottee does not intend to withdraw from the project, he shall be paid every month's interest for delay in handing over possession as such rate as may be prescribed.

  • In this context, the Supreme Court in the case of Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd.(supra) in paragraphs 22 and 25 has expressly observed that the allottee has an unqualified right to claim interest under Section 18(1) of the RERA Act if the promoter fails to discharge his obligation in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement. This unqualified right is not dependent on any contingencies or stipulations and therefore the legislature has consciously provided this right of refund as an unconditional absolute right to the allottee if the promoter fails to give possession within the stipulated time regardless of unforeseen events or stay order of the Court which is in either way not attributable to the allottee.

  • Thus, it is clear that the doctrine of frustration comes into play when a contract becomes impossible of performance, after it is made, on account of circumstances beyond the control of the parties. The doctrine is a special case of impossibility and as such comes under Section 56 of the Contract Act. However, the performance of a contract is never discharged merely because it may become onerous to one of the parties. It is settled legal position that this doctrine is not to be lightly invoked; that mere incidence of expense or delay or onerousness is not sufficient; and that there has to be as it were a break in identity between the contract as provided for and contemplated and its performance in the new circumstances.

[ Link Synopsis ]

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ii). REAT Punjab (2026.05.25)  in Neeraj Verma & Anr. vs ATS Estates Pvt. Ltd.& Ors. [Complaint No. RERA/ GC No.0171 of 2023] held that;-

  • The right to claim interest on the period of delayed possession is an indefeasible and unqualified right given to an allottee by the statute which cannot be taken away or declined as has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its landmark decision in M/s. Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and others in Civil Appeal Nos. 6745-6749 of 2021.

[ Link Sunopsis ]

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iii) REAT Maharashtra (2026.04.27) in CCI Projects Private Limited v. Ramesh Shivsaran Singh & Ors.   [Appeal Nos. AT006-53079 to 53179 of 2021 ] held that;-

  • The substantive provisions of Section 18 (1) (a) of RERA Act, 2016 would prevail to provide interest and/or compensation on account of delay, rendering Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act ineffective.

  • Right conferred under Section 18 of RERA Act, 2016 to allottees is indefeasible. Section 18 of RERA Act itself is a notice to the promoter about the claim of allottees and therefore, merely because allottees have made payments to promoter towards consideration value even after unilateral change of dates of possession by the promoter that does not mean that allottees have waived their right to claim interest.

  • Therefore, we are of the considered view that there is no waiver and allottees are well within their right to claim interest for delay in possession in terms of Section 18 (1) (a) of RERA Act, 2016.” 

[ Link Synopsis ]

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iv).  HC Bombay (2025.10.08) in Keyana Estate LLP (Earlier Known as Kiyana Ventures LLP) Vs. Paresh Parihar & Anr.  [2025:BHC-AS:44637,  Second Appeal No. 537 Of 2025 with Interim Application No. 11757 Of 2025] held that;

  • in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt Ltd Vs State of U.P. & Ors,[ 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044.] the allottee has an unqualified right to seek the interest on the delayed handing over the possession of the flat, as agreed.

  • A mere offer to deliver possession of the subject flat, without complying with the necessary conditions subject to which the O.C. has been issued, where those conditions bear upon the occupation of the subject flat as a habitable unit, cannot be considered as the compliance of the obligation of the promoter under the Act, 2016.

  • Section 270A of the MMC Act, inter alia provides that no person shall occupy or permit to be occupied, or use or permit to be used, any premises or part thereof until he has obtained a certificate from the Commissioner to the effect that there is adequate supply of water to the persons intending to occupy or use such premises.

  • In these circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the Appellant committed default in the delivery of the possession of the subject flat, even after the grant of O.C. At any rate, the grant of O.C. was also much beyond the agreed date of delivery of possession of the subject flat. A clear case of violation of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, 2016 was made out.

  • The submission of Mr. Dave premised on the force majeure is required to be noted to be repelled as in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Newtech Promoters and Developers (Supra) such submission cannot be readily acceded to. Even otherwise, no case of unforeseen event resulting in delay has been made out.

[ Link Synopsis ]

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v). UP-REAT (2025.04.01) in Smt. Sushma Shukla Vs. Lucknow Development Authority,  [Appeal No.100 of 2019] held that.

  • The allottee on booking/allotment of the unit, the document would bind the promoter to the declared date of completion. In the event no date is declared, in that event three years would be taken as the tentative completion date depending on facts and circumstances of each case vide, M/s. Fortune Infrastructure. Vs. Trevor D’lima and others: (2018) 5 SCC 442.

  • In the event, the date of completion of the project with U.P. RERA, being at variance with the declared date of completion would have no bearing on computation of the interest component on the deposits made by the allottee. The burden of interest, on the promoter begins to run from the date declared by the promoter to the appellant till handing over possession of the unit.

  •  In the event, promoter declares a date subsequent to the earlier date of completion, it would mean and indicate that the project is delayed. Section 18 (1) of the Act would become operative leaving it open to the allottee to either continue in the delayed project or withdraw from the project.

  • It, therefore, follows that the declaration of a subsequent date of  completion with RERA made by the promoter does not shift the liability and obligation mandated under Section 18 (1) of the Act, 2016.

  • The mandate of Section 18 (1) is absolute and unconditional casting upon the promoter a positive mandatory obligation to pay interest to the allottee who has continued in the project for the delay. The liability to pay interest by the promoter would start running from the initial date declared by the promoter. The promoter cannot recile/retract from his commitment declared to the allottee.

  • A mandatory statutory obligation is cast upon the promoter to pay the interest to such allottees. The expression employed by the legislature is, ‘shall be paid, by the promoter,’ to the allottee. Unlike the main provision, under the proviso allottee  is not required to make a demand for the interest. In the event promoter fails to comply the mandatory obligation to pay the interest, the promotee exposes itself for penal consequences under Chapter VIII of Act, 2016.

  • Hence, settlement cannot override the rights and obligations created by statutes in favour of a party. The proviso to Section 18 (1) of the Act, 2016 casts upon the promoter a statutory obligation to pay interest for the delayed project creates a statutory right in favour of allottee to receive the amount towards interest.

  • Any agreement/settlement circumventing the statutory provision (proviso to Section 18 (1) of the Act, 2016, cannot contradict or circumvent the statutory requirements and the mandatory legal obligations that govern to protect the interest of the allottee.

  • The compromise or the contract must align with the statutory provisions and the terms of the contract cannot be interpreted in a manner that would contradict the statutory requirement of Act, 2016.

[ Link Synopsis ]

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vi). UP-REAT (2025.04.01) in Sanjeev Aggarwal Vs. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority  [Appeal No.687 of 2022] held that.

  • In view thereof, the offer of possession made by the respondent without obtaining completion certificate is not a legal and valid offer of possession of the unit. The appellant was justified in not accepting the physical possession of the unit as the respondent/promoter was at default. There is no concept in law/bye laws of the competent authority of issuing completion certificate (OC/CC) of a project from a retrospective date.

  • The offer of possession, execution of lease/sale deed and thereafter physical possession of the unit in habitable condition follows OC/CC and not other way round as per scheme of Act 2016.

  • That the declaration of a subsequent date of completion with RERA made by the promoter does not shift the liability and obligation mandated under Section 18 (1) of the Act, 2016 to a future date.

  • The mandate of Section 18(1) (proviso) is absolute and unconditional casting upon the promoter a positive mandatory obligation to pay interest to the allottee who has continued in the project for the delay. The liability to pay interest by the promoter would start running from the initial date of completion declared by the promoter to  the allottee. The promoter cannot recile/retract from his commitment declared to the allottee.

  • Unlike the main provision, under the proviso, allottee is not required to make a demand for the interest. In the event promoter fails to comply the mandatory obligation to pay the interest, the promoter, in that event, exposes itself for penal consequences under Chapter VIII of Act, 2016.

[ Link Synopsis ]

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vii). REAT Mumbai (2025.02.24) in Pratibha Fabrics Limited Vs. Macrotech Developers Limited,. [APPEAL NO. AT006000000052817 Of 2021] held that;

  • It is the settled positions of law that the provisions of the Section 18 of the Act continue to be applicable even if the captioned complaints have been filed after taking possession of the respective subject flats.

  • Therefore, it is more than evident that the possession offer letter dated 14th January 2018 and the e-mail dated 06th June 20t7 had been prepared as one sided, without full disclosure of all relevant specific details and therefore, the possession letter is unreasonable, one sided and imbalanced.

  • A term of a contract will not be final and binding if it is shown that the flat purchasers had no option but to sign on the dotted line, on a contract framed by the builder. The contractual terms of the Agreement dated 08.05.2012 are ex-facie one-sided, unfair, and unreasonable. The incorporation of such one-sided clauses in an agreement constitutes an unfair trade practice as per Section 2 ® of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 since it adopts unfair methods or practices for the purpose of selling the flats by the Builder.

[ Link Synopsis ]

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viii). REAT UP (2024.09.14) in Abha Khanna (IPE) Vs. KVG Realtech Pvt. Ltd. [(2024) ibclaw.in 133 REAT, Appeal No. 243/2020] held that; 

  • The issue of offering handing over possession prior to obtaining occupancy certificate was also examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 1232 and 1443-1444 of 2019 R.V. Prasannakumaar and ors. Vs. Mantri Castles Pvt. Ltd. and ors. decided on 11.02.2019 wherein it has been observed that possession cannot be handed over prior to obtaining occupancy certificate. 

  • That as per the provisions of the U.P. Apartments Act, 2010 read with the provisions of Act, 2016  a  Promoter is required to offer legal and habitable possession to the allottees only after obtaining OC/CC and ask for clearing dues by raising final demand.

  • The failure of the Developer to comply with the contractual obligation to provide the flat within the contractually stipulated period, would amount to a deficiency of service. Given the one-sided nature of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement, the consumer fora had the jurisdiction to award just and reasonable compensation as an incident of the power to direct removal of deficiency in service.

  • That the right so given to the allottee is unqualified and if availed, the money deposited by the allottee has to be refunded with interest at such rate as may be prescribed and the

  • Proviso to Section 18(1) contemplates a situation where the allottee does not intend to withdraw from the Project. In that case he is entitled to and must be paid interest for every month of delay till the handing over of the possession.

  • It is upto the allottee to proceed either under Section 18(1) or under proviso to Section 18(1).

  • If an allottee chooses to remain in the project and in case the allottee seeks refund then he is entitled for interest on the deposited amount and/or compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act 2016, which in our considered view will be in accordance with the principles of equity as well.

[ Link Synopsis ]

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ix). REAT Mumbai (2024.08.21) in Spenta Builders Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Ashlesh Gosain .[(2024) ibclaw.in 115 REAT, Appeal No. AT00600000052402/20, Appeal No. AT00600000052942/21] held that; 

  • If the Allottee chooses to continue in the project, he is entitled only interest on delayed possession and not compensation.

  • Explanation to Section 6 of RERA which clearly clarifies that" force majeure" shall mean case of war, flood, drought, fire, cyclone' earthquake or any other calamity caused by nature, affecting the regular development of real estate project.

  • Therefore, we are of the considered view that delay in granting permissions/ sanctions from various competent authorities, etc. as contended by the Promoter cannot be construed as "force majeure” The Promoter can neither expect Allottee to be aware of the likely delay nor can make Allottee bear the brunt of the failure on the part of Promoter act professionally by assessing the requisite date for possession'

[ Link Synopsis ]

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Imp. Rulings - Allottee’s Right to withdraw from project under RERA.

  Imp. Rulings - Allottee’s Right to withdraw from project under RERA.

Index;

  1. HC Bombay (2025.07.18) in Linker Shelter Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Charmaine Chougule & Ors. [2025:BHC-AS:30212, Second Appeal No.. 391 of 2025 With Interim Application No. 10454 OF 2024]

  2. SCI (2020.11.02) in M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. Vs Anil Patni And Anr. [Civil Appeal No. 3581-3590 of 2020]

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i). HC Bombay (2025.07.18) in Linker Shelter Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Charmaine Chougule & Ors. [2025:BHC-AS:30212, SECOND APPEAL NO. 391 OF 2025 WITH INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 10454 OF 2024] held that;

  • In terms of Section 18 of the RERA Act, if a promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment duly completed by the date specified in the agreement, the promoter would be liable, on demand, to return the amount received by him in respect of that apartment if the allottee wishes to withdraw from the Project. Such right of an allottee is specifically made "without prejudice to any other remedy available to him". The right so given to the allottee is unqualified and if availed, the money deposited by the allottee has to be refunded with interest at such rate as may be prescribed.

  • The unqualified right of the allottee to seek refund referred under Section 18(1)(a) and Section 19(4) of the Act is not dependent on any contingencies or stipulations thereof. It appears that the legislature has consciously provided this right of refund on demand as an unconditional absolute right to the allottee, if the promoter fails to give possession of the apartment, plot or building within the time stipulated under the terms of the agreement regardless of unforeseen events or stay orders of the court/tribunal, which is in either way not attributable to the allottee/homebuyer, the promoter is under an obligation to refund the amount on demand with interest at the rate prescribed by the State Government including compensation in the manner provided under the Act with the proviso that if the allottee does not wish to withdraw from the project, he shall be entitled for interest for the period of delay till handing over possession at the rate prescribed."

  • The proviso to section 12 provides that if the person affected by any incorrect false statement intends to withdraw from the proposed project, he shall be entitled to return of his entire investment along with interest at such rate as may be prescribed and compensation in the manner provided under the said Act.

  • The case of an allottee where he or she wants to claim compensation for loss caused 'due to defective title of the land' covers the aspect of litigation about title of the land. This is specifically provided under section 18(2) of the said Act and it cannot be included or confused with the remedy provided under section 18(1) or the proviso thereto.

  •  It is therefore clear that in cases where the promoter/developer fails to complete or is unable to give possession of premises by the date specified in the agreement, the liability of the developer depends on the decision taken by the allottee whether to withdraw from the project or continue therewith as provided under section 18(1)(a) & (b) and the proviso.

  • Therefore I hold that the allottee under section 18(1) of the said Act can not indefinitely postpone the decision about withdrawing from the project or continuing therewith beyond a period of 2 months from the date of possession being offered alongwith OC / CC as the case may be, provided there is no injunction against the developer from doing so.

  • There is no indication that pendency of litigation is fatal to the offer of possession by the promoter as long as the competent planning authority has issued the OC/CC (as the case may be) and there is no order of injunction restraining the promoter from doing so. No such prohibition is either pointed out or seen in the scheme of the said Act.

  • Therefore in my view, the possession offered by the developer can not be compulsorily meant as only without any litigation over the subject property; of course it has to be offered with OC / CC (as the case may be) duly obtained from competent planning authority and there has to be no order of injunction restraining the developer from doing so.

  • When the allottees were under duty to take possession of the flat within a period of 2 months of OC issued to the said premises, it cannot be said that despite possession being offered, the allottees can wait indefinitely and decide on some day of their choice to demand refund. Therefore it has to be held that the Appellant developer will be liable to refund with interest till end of 2 months from the date when possession was offered with OC (21.12.2018).

  • The Appellant Developer is directed to refund to the Respondents the respective amounts paid by Respondents (including amounts of taxes, registration fees and other statutory payments) with interest (at the rate of highest marginal cost of lending rate of State Bank of India plus 2%) from date of receipt of payments till 21.02.2019. This amount is to be paid within a period of 4 weeks from today. Charge of these amounts will continue on the respective flats, till payment is fully made.

[ Link Synopsis ]

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ii). SCI (2020.11.02) in M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. Vs Anil Patni And Anr. [Civil Appeal No. 3581-3590 of 2020] held that;

  • It has consistently been held by this Court that the remedies available under the provisions of the CP Act are additional remedies over and above the other remedies including those made available under any special statutes; and that the availability of an alternate remedy is no bar in entertaining a complaint under the CP Act.

  • In terms of Section 18 of the RERA Act, if a promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment duly completed  by the date specified in the agreement, the Promoter would be liable, on demand, to return the amount received by him in respect of that apartment if the allottee wishes to withdraw from the Project. Such right of an allottee is specifically made “without prejudice to any other remedy available to him”. The right so given to the allottee is unqualified and if availed, the money deposited by the allottee has to be refunded with interest at such rate as may be prescribed.

  • Thus, the parliamentary intent is clear that a choice or discretion is given to the allottee whether he wishes to initiate appropriate proceedings under the CP Act or file an application under the RERA Act.

  • It is relevant to note that even for the purposes of Section 18, the period has to be reckoned in terms of the agreement and not the registration.

[ Link Synopsis ]

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Saturday, 27 June 2026

State Bank of India Vs. Chandramouli Ramasubramaniam, Liquidator of Effimax Engineers Pvt. Ltd. - Passing of an order without assigning reasons on the pleadings raised by the parties, would vitiate the very purpose of adjudicatory role which has been assigned to the courts/ the Tribunals to settle the controversy between the parties, on merits. At the least, a litigant is entitled to learn the reasons for not accepting his plea, and that can be possible only when the court discloses its mind by assigning reasons.

 NCLAT (2026.06.01) in State Bank of India Vs. Chandramouli Ramasubramaniam, Liquidator of Effimax Engineers Pvt. Ltd. [(2026) ibclaw.in 770 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) No. 415/2024 (IA Nos. 1133/2024)] held that;

  • In any adjudicated matter, in which the pleadings, raised by the parties are not considered and no finding are recorded either accepting or denying the contentions raised by the parties to the proceedings, the resultant order will have to be treated as vitiated because it will amount to be an order which is non-speaking. Passing of an order without assigning any reasons goes against the tenets of the adjudication of a case on merits, which is the basic spirit contemplated for the purposes of an effective adjudication of a controversy between the parties. 

  • Passing of an order without assigning reasons on the pleadings raised by the parties, would vitiate the very purpose of adjudicatory role which has been assigned to the courts/ the Tribunals to settle the controversy between the parties, on merits. At the least, a litigant is entitled to learn the reasons for not accepting his plea, and that can be possible only when the court discloses its mind by assigning reasons.


Excerpts of the Order;

01.06.2026:

The genesis of the controversy at hand, as it engages consideration in the instant company appeal, is filing of an IA being IA(IBC) No. 500 of 2024 on 17.02.2024 that was preferred by the Appellant by invoking the provisions contained under Section 60 (5)(c) of I & B Code, 2016.


# 2. In the application thus preferred, the Appellant had modulated certain reliefs, seeking a direction to the Respondent therein, i.e., the Liquidator,

(a) to transfer or release a sum of Rs. 5,21,000/- to the Applicant forthwith, i.e., the State Bank of India,

(b) not to claim or raise a bill towards the remuneration with effect from 01.12.2023 and

(c) to refund a sum of Rs. 4,72,000/- being claimed towards remuneration for the period from August 2023 to November 2023 to the Applicant State Bank of India because no services have been rendered for the said period.

On this application, which was numbered as IA(IBC) No. 500 of 2024, Ld. NCLT has passed the order dated 24.06.2024, directing the Liquidator to distribute Rs. 5,21,000/- to stakeholders and also directing Stakeholders Consultation Committee (SCC) to bear the liquidation expenses till the Liquidator completes the liquidation proceedings and relieved of his duties. It is this order which is being challenged in the instant appeal.


# 3. Primarily, the solitary argument as extended to be pressed by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant while giving a challenge to the impugned order had been that, the impugned order passed on the application happens to be procedurally bad and without application of mind, because it has been passed by Ld. NCLT without considering the grounds that, has been agitated by the Appellant/Applicant while pressing upon the application and without recording its finding for accepting or not accepting the grounds that have been raised by the Appellant/Applicant in the application qua the relief that was sought therein.


# 4. The Appellant’s case is that, as a consequence of filing of an application under Section 9 of the I & B Code by the Operational Creditor, Mr. Narendra Sakariya, the proprietor of M/s. Madras Steels and Tubes against the Corporate Debtor (CD), M/s. Effimax Engineers Private Limited, the proceedings of the CP (IB)/36(CHE)/2021 was initiated, and the Corporate Debtor was directed to be admitted to the CIRP by an order passed of 15.12.2021, and Mr. T. Sivagurunathan was appointed as IRP to conduct the CIRP proceedings.


# 5. He has further submitted that the Respondent herein was appointed as RP on 08.03.2022 and Form G inviting of Expression of Interest was issued on 04.05.2022 calling for submission of the Resolution Plan by 09.06.2022. In the 4th CoC meeting on 14.06.2022, the Respondent informed CoC that only one Prospective Resolution Applicant (PRA) had submitted their Resolution Plan, and that it was found to be ineligible as the net worth criteria as mandated by the CoC was not complied with by the PRA. In the same meeting, CoC by 100% voting in favour, resolved to liquidate the CD as CIRP period of 180 days ended on the same day.


# 6. In terms of the decision of the CoC taken on 14.06.2022 an application being IA No. 688/2022, was preferred under Section 33 (2) of the I & B Code, for liquidation of the Corporate Debtor which was allowed by the Ld. Tribunal on 17.11.2022, consequent to which, the Respondent was appointed as the Liquidator, and his remuneration was fixed at the rate of Rs. 1,00,000/- per month + 18% GST as per the Regulation 4(1) of IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, to be read with Regulation 39D of IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, which stood approved by the CoC in its meeting that was held on 14.06.2022. Though for the instant company appeal it is not relevant, but it is yet apt to mention that, though the liquidation order was subjected to challenge in the company appeal, being CA (AT) (INS) No. 146/2023 but in the absence of there being any interim order the liquidation process continued. Subsequent by the passing of the order of liquidation, the Stakeholders Consultation Committee (SCC) held a meeting on 23.11.2022, sent intimation letters to all the statutory departments who were likely to be affected on the commencement of liquidation process. The liquidation process is yet to be completed.


# 7. The Appellant has submitted that he had contended before Ld. NCLT that the Respondent / Liquidator had collected the receivables of Rs. 40,84,829/- from the DRDO on 30.11.2022 and 03.01.2023 and failed to distribute the same to stakeholders within 90 days, that he distributed only Rs. 19,58,457/- on 25.10.2023 only after repeated requests, that he did not conduct investigations into financial affairs of the CD despite prima facie evidence to show that the huge gap in the value receivables and sundry debtors, indicating the non-availability of stock/raw materials and did not take steps to file application under Section 66 of IBC despite a request from the SCC on 14.02.2023 and that the Liquidator did not convene the SCC to discuss on the suspension of the Liquidator by IBBI.


# 8. He had further submitted before the Ld. NCLT that owing to the fact that the time period for completing liquidation process had expired on 16.11.2023, SCC had advised to file the necessary application for dissolution of the Corporate Debtor to further avoid unnecessary expenses, including the amount payable to the Respondent towards the remuneration, which the Liquidator failed to carry out.


# 9. The Appellant had further contended in the application that in the correspondence made on 30.11.2023 to the Respondent he had requested to release the amount of Rs. 5,21,000/- which was being withheld by the Liquidator to cover liquidation expenses in violation of the provisions contained under the Regulation 41(3) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations 2016, which was not done. Instead, the Liquidator raised the invoices for the period from August 2023 to November 2023 for an amount of Rs. 4,72,000/- which he was not legally entitled to, owing to the fact that no business operations were carried out during the said period.


# 10. Under the aforesaid backdrop, when the Applicant/Appellant had preferred the said application IA (IBC)/500/2024, praying for a direction to the Liquidator to release the said amount of Rs. 5,21,000/- unlawfully withheld, to refund Rs. 4,72,000/- already claimed towards the remuneration for August-November 2023 band not to raise any claim for remuneration with effect from 01.12.2023 as no liquidation operations were being carried out. But the impugned order passed on the said application directed the Liquidator to release Rs. 5,21,000/- only. It did not touch the other two reliefs sought for. Instead, it directed SCC to pay the liquidation expenses.


# 11. Under the aforesaid backdrop, Ld. Counsel for Appellant has argued that in a judicial proceedings where the issue involves determination and distribution of the financial assets and liabilities adjudication of the same can only be done when the Ld. Tribunal considers the grounds taken by the Appellant in the application, and applies its judicious mind to either to accept or not to accept the grounds raised by the Appellant, in the application for the grant of relief as it was prayed in IA(IBC) No. 500 of 2024. However, in the instant case, the impugned order doesn’t reveal as to whether the Ld. Tribunal have at all assigned any reasons while rejecting the application preferred by the Appellant, and therefore the order suffers from non-application of mind, being an unreasoned order without application of mind.


# 12. During the course of arguments, when we called upon the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent, who was opposing the proceedings of the instant company appeal, to answer the solitary ground extended by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant, that the impugned order happens to be perverse because no finding on merits has been recorded qua the pleadings raised in the application, no plausible reply was forthcoming from him, and rather it was tacitly accepted that the order was passed by the Ld. Tribunal without application of mind, and without expressing any opinion on merits of the matter, qua the relief claimed by the Appellant in the IA(IBC) No. 500 of 2024.


# 13. The basic governing principles of adjudication is that whatever plea has been taken by the parties to the proceedings in a judicial proceeding, that has to be considered by the Court/Tribunal while deciding the controversy inter se between the parties in order to repose confidence among the litigants that their matter has been considered on merits, to avoid any arbitrariness that may come in and to attach fairness to the proceedings that, is being adjudicated upon by the Ld. Court/Tribunal. In any adjudicated matter, in which the pleadings, raised by the parties are not considered and no finding are recorded either accepting or denying the contentions raised by the parties to the proceedings, the resultant order will have to be treated as vitiated because it will amount to be an order which is non-speaking. Passing of an order without assigning any reasons goes against the tenets of the adjudication of a case on merits, which is the basic spirit contemplated for the purposes of an effective adjudication of a controversy between the parties. Passing of an order without assigning reasons on the pleadings raised by the parties, would vitiate the very purpose of adjudicatory role which has been assigned to the courts/ the Tribunals to settle the controversy between the parties, on merits. At the least, a litigant is entitled to learn the reasons for not accepting his plea, and that can be possible only when the court discloses its mind by assigning reasons.


# 14. In view of the above, the impugned order of 24.06.2024 would hereby stand quashed. The matter is remitted back to the NCLT Division Bench, Chennai to redecide the application, IA(IBC) No. 500(CHE)2024, exclusively on its merits. Nothing observed by this Appellate Tribunal in the above order may be construed to be a finding on merits of the matter and any adjudication, which will follow a sequel to this order, would be independent to any of the findings recorded.

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