V. Chandrasekhar Naidu Vs. E. Muneendra & Ors. - In this regard, we place our reliance on the well-entrenched principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings. This Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage at the behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate the issues arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the parties.

 HC Andhra Pradesh  (2026.06.18) in  V. Chandrasekhar Naidu Vs. E. Muneendra & Ors.  [APHC010287242026, Writ Appeal No. 684 of 2026 ] held that;

• This view is contrary to the settled law that a question, which did not form part of the pleadings or in respect of which the parties were not at variance and which was not the subject-matter of any issue, could not be decided by the court.

• Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ.

• In this regard, we place our reliance on the well-entrenched principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings. This Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage at the behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate the issues arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the parties."

Excerpts of the Order; 

Heard Sri Kondaparthy Kiran Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant appearing through virtual mode, Ms. Maheswari Arika, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 7, and the learned Government Pleader for Revenue for respondent Nos.8, 10, 12 & 13.

# 2. This writ appeal has been filed by the appellant/respondent No.7 (in the writ petition), aggrieved by the order dated 08.05.2026 passed in W.P.No.14219 of 2026, whereby the learned Single Judge directed the parties to maintain status quo, as on the date of the order, with regard to the subject land, with respect to the mutation of the names of the parties concerned for the subject land.

# 3. Respondent Nos.1 to 7 herein are the writ petitioners in W.P.No.14219 of 2026. The appellant herein is respondent No.7 and respondent Nos.8 to 13 herein are the official respondents.

# 4. The dispute between the appellant and the writ petitioners pertains to the subject land i.e., to an extent of Ac.2.48 cents in Sy.No.243/3, situated at Cherlopalle Village, Tirupati Rural Mandal, Tirupati District (erstwhile Chittoor District).

# 5. The case of the writ petitioners was that the subject land was assigned in favour of the writ petitioners' grandfather and he remained in possession and enjoyment thereof which was also so recorded in the revenue records. The Urban Development Authority issued notice dated 27.02.1987 under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and called for the objections and after submission of the objections, the proceedings were withdrawn in the year 1987. It is their further case that the petitioners' grandfather nor his sons transferred the subject land to anyone. However, respondent No.7 in writ petition claimed that his father had purchased the land from the petitioners' grandfather/his legal heirs. Respondent No.6 in the writ petition passed the order of resumption on 16.08.1987 on the ground of violation of the terms and conditions of the assignment which was challenged by the father of respondent No.7 in writ petition No.12556 of 1999 which was disposed of with the direction to the Tahsildar concerned to reconsider the issue with reference to Section 3(5) of the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfer) Act, 1977. After enquiry an order was passed in favour of the father of respondent No.7 on 13.11.1990 but after his death again the proposal for resumption of the land was initiated on the ground that the land use was changed, into non-agricultural, for the setting up a brick kiln. The order of resumption was passed on 19.06.2006, which was challenged in appeal. The appeal was allowed. The resumption order was set aside on 15.03.2008 by RDO but this order was again set aside in revision on 30.10.2009 by the Joint Collector, with direction to resume the land as per the Rules and to make necessary changes in the revenue records. Respondent No.7 in writ petition, filed W.P.No.26503 of 2009 which was allowed on 03.02.2020 by setting aside the order dated 30.10.2009. Challenging the order dated 03.02.2020 two writ appeal Nos.373 and 572 of 2021 were filed, which were dismissed confirming the order passed in Writ Petition.

# 6. Petitioners further case is that respondent No.7 in writ petition without approaching the competent civil court made representation dated 19.05.2025 before the Joint Collector for deletion of the land from prohibited properties list under Section 22A of the Registration Act, 1908 for the land to the disputed extent, which was allowed vide order dated 19.02.2026 deleting the land from the prohibited property list. The writ petitioners' case is that, the order dated 19.02.2026 was passed without notice to them. Challenging the order dated 19.02.2026, the writ petitioners filed appeal along with stay application on 15.04.2026 and the same is pending adjudication before the appellate authority. Their further case is that in the meantime, the entry in revenue records was changed to certain extent of an area, and the petitioners' possession was being attempted to be disturbed by their dispossession/eviction without following due process of law. So they filed the writ petition for direction to the respondents in the writ petition not to evict/dispossess the petitioners from the subject land pending the statutory appeal.

# 7. The learned Single Judge, by order dated 08.05.2026, disposed of the writ petition No.14219 of 2026, inter alia, directing the appellate authority to consider and dispose of the statutory appeal strictly in accordance with law, by hearing all the parties concerned and upon verification of the record and the subject land within the period stipulated. The operative part reads as under :

• "6. In view of the above said facts and circumstances, since the appeal is pending before the 2nd respondent, it is just and necessary to dispose of the same in accordance with law to meet the ends of justice. For the said purpose, the 2nd respondent is directed to consider and dispose of the appeal of the petitioners dated 15.04.2026 strictly in accordance with law by hearing all the parties concerned including the petitioners and the 7th respondent herein, upon verification of the records and the subject land, appropriate decision shall be taken on its own merits as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of four (4) months from the date of receipt of this order. In the meanwhile, there shall be an order of status quo as on today to be maintained with respect to the mutation of the names of the parties concerned for the subject land covered under the, said appeal.

• 7. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. Interim order, if any, deemed to have been vacated. There shall be no order as to costs."

# 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that so far as the direction to the statutory appellate authority to dispose of the appeal is concerned, the appellant has no grievance which is confined only to that part of the order whereby the parties have been directed to maintain status quo as on the date of the order, with regard to the mutation in respect of the subject land. He submits that in the writ petition there was no challenge on the point of mutation of entries and no relief was sought in that regard. The only relief claimed in the writ petition was with respect to the alleged possession and dispossession from the subject land during the pendency of the statutory appeal before the respondent No.2. Learned counsel submits that such a direction in the judgment under appeal is beyond the scope of the relief sought in the writ petition. He places reliance in State of Himachal Pradesh and Others v. Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh [(2011) 6 SCC 597].

# 9. Learned counsel for the writ appellant/7th respondent in writ petition further submits that the mutation of the name of the appellant had already taken place in respect of an extent of Ac.1.65 cents out of the total extent of Ac.2.48 cents of the subject land.

# 10. Learned counsel for the writ appellant further submits that the appellant has already instituted O.S. No.47 of 2026 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tirupati, against the writ petitioners (defendants in the suit), in which, the learned Civil Judge, by order dated 21.04.2026, has granted an ad interim temporary injunction to the effect, "accordingly ad-interim injunction is granted in favour of the petitioner against the respondents from restraining them not to interfere with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff's over the petition schedule property by dispensing the notice to them" which also finds mention in paragraph No.5 of the impugned judgment. If the writ petitioners are aggrieved from the grant of the ad interim injunction, they should take recourse to the remedy open to them under law.

# 11. Learned counsel for the write petitioners/respondent Nos.1 to 7 in writ appeal, submits that, pursuant to the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition, the statutory appeal is required to be decided expeditiously so, the direction to maintain status quo with respect to the mutation entries in the revenue records is justified and calls for no interference.

# 12. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 7 further submits that respondent Nos.1 to 7 were not served with the notice of the suit proceedings. The ad interim temporary injunction is ex parte. They came to know about the said order in the course of the writ proceedings and they are taking steps to enter appearance and take appropriate steps before the learned trial Court in the suit proceedings. However, the writ appellant is attempting to dispossess the writ petitioners from the subject land and in such a case, irreparable injury would be caused to the petitioners/respondent Nos.1 to 7.

# 13. We have considered the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.

# 14. Insofar as the direction issued by the learned Single Judge for expeditious disposal of the pending statutory appeal is concerned, learned counsels for both the sides have no grievance.

# 15. The grievance of the writ appellant is with respect to the direction to maintain status quo in relation to the mutation entries.

# 16. We find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. The relief sought in the writ petition did not pertain to the mutation entries in the revenue records, but was with respect to the alleged attempt of the respondent Nos.5 and 6 in writ petition to dispossess the writ petitioners from the subject land, without following due process of law.

# 17. The prayer in writ petition reads as under:

• ".....to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondents in trying to dispossess the petitioners from the land to an extent of Ac. 2.48 cents in No.243/3 of Cherlopalle Village, Tirupati Rural Mandal, Tirupati District, (erstwhile Chittoor District) pending appeal dated 15.04.2026 before the 2nd Respondent as illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional against the principles of natural justice and consequently direct the Respondents not evict/dispossess the Petitioners from the land to an extent of Ac. 2.48 cents in Sy.No.243/3 of Cherlopalle Village, Tirupati Rural Mandal, Tirupati District, (erstwhile Chittoor District) pending appeal dated 15.04.2026 before the 2nd Respondent and to pass....."

# 18. The writ petition did not contain any prayer with respect to the mutation entries. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 7 could not dispute that there was any prayer in the writ petition with respect to the mutation entries. In State of Himachal Pradesh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held at paragraph No.17, as follows:

• "17. We have already adverted to the relief prayed for by the respondent Association in the said writ petition. Admittedly, there is no prayer for quashing of even earlier Cabinet decision or order of the Government. The conclusion of the High Court quashing the Cabinet decision dated 18-7-2009 and as a consequence issuing several directions is unacceptable and contrary to the well- established principles. First of all, there was no prayer for quashing of any decision of the State Government much less the subsequent Cabinet decision dated 18-7-2009. If the High Court was interested in going into the said decision that too after reserving the judgment on 3-7-2009, it is but appropriate to reopen the case, permit the petitioner Association to amend the relief portion and afford adequate opportunity to the State to put forth its stand for modifying this "policy" curtailing certain courses under SCVT. Admittedly, the High Court has not resorted to such a recourse and simply quashed the decision of the Cabinet dated 18-7-2009 and issued various directions which are impermissible."

# 19. The settled legal proposition, therefore, is that a Court ought not to grant a relief which has not been prayed in the writ petition being beyond the scope of the writ petition.

# 20. In Union of India V. E.I.D.Parry (India) Ltd., 2 , the High Court on its own proceeded to consider the validity of the Rule and ultimately held that it was not in consonance with the relevant provisions of the Railways Act,1890 and consequently held that it was ultra vires. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that the view taken by the High Court was contrary to the settled law that a question, which did not form part of the pleadings or in respect of which the parties were not at variance and which was not the subject matter of any issue, could not be decided by the Court. It was further held that the High Court travelled beyond the pleadings in declaring the Rule to be ultra vires. So, the judgment of the High Court could not be sustained. The relevant portion of paragraph No.4 reads as under :

• ".....4. This view is contrary to the settled law that a question, which did not form part of the pleadings or in respect of which the parties were not at variance and which was not the subject-matter of any issue, could not be decided by the court. The scope of the suit was (2000) 2 SCC 223 limited. The pleadings comprising of the averments set out in the plaint and the defence put up by the present appellant in their written statement did not relate to the validity of the rule struck down by the High Court. The High Court, therefore, travelled beyond the pleadings in declaring the rule to be ultra vires. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, on this question cannot be sustained."

# 21. In State of Orissa and another V. Mamata Mohanty3, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the relief not claimed could not have been granted. The relevant paragraph No.55 reads as under:

• "Relief not claimed--cannot be granted

• 55. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a settled legal proposition that "as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted". Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. [Vide Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho [(1897-98) 25 (2011) 3 SCC 436 IA 195 (PC)] , Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar [(1953) 1 SCC 456 : AIR 1953 SC 235] , Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (L.A.) [(2005) 7 SCC 190 : AIR 2005 SC 3165] and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. [(2010) 4 SCC 518 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 207] ]"

# 22. Recently in Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar and Others V. Union of India and Others [2025 SCC Online 2064] the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is settled principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not found in the pleadings. The relevant paragraph No.18 reads as under :

• "18. In this regard, we place our reliance on the well-entrenched principle of law that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings. This Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage at the behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate the issues arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the parties."

# 23. We find that the writ petition did not contain any prayer relating to the mutation entries nor a prayer for maintaining status quo with respect to the mutation entries pending disposal of the statutory appeal.

# 24. Consequently, we are of the view that the part of the judgment pertaining to the directions issued by the learned single Judge to maintain status quo in respect of the mutation entries cannot be legally sustained. The same is accordingly, set aside to that extent.

# 25. However that is not the end of the matter. The fact remains that the prayer made in the writ petition has not been considered, regarding threat of alleged dispossession by not following the due process of law, in correct perspective.

# 26. The question as to which of the parties is in possession of the subject property and whether there is any attempt for illegal dispossession are matters which are directly in issue in the pending civil suit. It is not in dispute that the competent Civil Court has already granted an ad interim temporary injunction restraining the defendants therein, (the present respondents 1 to 7), and that notice has also been issued in the suit proceedings. Once the dispute is in the civil suit, the parties are required to work out their remedies before the learned trial Court. If the respondents 1 to 7 (writ petitioners) are aggrieved by the ad interim order of injunction or they intend to seek any further interim protection, it is open to them to approach the learned trial Court by filing an appropriate application in the suit or/and to institute the suit; whichever remedy may be available and as may be advised to them.

# 27. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the writ petitioners had no knowledge of the ad interim temporary injunction order passed in the suit, while filing the writ petition. Learned counsel for the writ appellant disputes and contends that they had the knowledge. We refrain from expressing any views on the said disputed question of fact.

# 28. Having regard to the submission advanced by the writ petitioners' counsel that there exists an imminent threat of dispossession of the writ petitioners, and further considering their contention that ad interim temporary injunction was granted in the pending civil suit ex parte and as the writ petitioners are now taking appropriate steps to enter appearance in the suit, we deem it appropriate to protect their interest for a limited period on the principle that no one can be dispossessed except by following due process of law.

# 29. We make it clear that we have not observed nor be understood as observing about the possession or/and alleged attempt of dispossession not by due process of law, in favour of or against any of the parties.

# 30. Accordingly, the writ petitioners shall be at liberty to approach the learned trial Court in an appropriate proceedings within a period of three (03) weeks from today. For the aforesaid period, if the writ petitioners are in possession of the subject property, they shall not be dispossessed except by due process of law.

# 31. It is further made clear that this order shall not preclude the learned trial Court from considering and passing appropriate orders on the applications strictly on its own merits and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations made in this judgment.

# 32. The statutory appellate authority shall also proceed and dispose of the pending statutory appeal expeditiously, in terms of the direction issued by the learned Single Judge for expeditious disposal.

# 33. With the above observations and directions, the Writ Appeal is allowed in part.

No order as to costs.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed.

---------------------------------------------------------

M/s. Rajasthan Art Emporium Vs. Kuwait Airways & Anr. - It is a trite law that a party is not entitled to seek relief which he has not prayed for.

SCI (09.11.2023) in M/s. Rajasthan Art Emporium Vs. Kuwait Airways & Anr. [Civil Appeal No. 9106 Of 2012 (Neutral Citation No. 2023 INSC 996)] held that;

•  It is a trite law that a party is not entitled to seek relief which he has not prayed for. 

Excerpts of the Order;    

These two appeals are cross appeals preferred against the order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission1 dated 01.10.2012 in Original Petition No. 229 of 1997 whereby the complaint filed by the appellant/complainant was disposed of while directing respondent no. 1 to pay the appellant/complainant US$ 500750/- or Rs. 20 lakhs is less along with 9% per annum compensation with effect from 31.07.1996 till its realization.

2. The case of the appellant/complainant is that it is an exporter of all kinds of handicrafts goods to several countries including USA. The appellant/complainant had received an order from M/s. Williams Sonoma Inc. USA for supply of handicraft goods. Accordingly, the appellant/complainant had to send three shipments of 1538 packages weighing 26,859.5 kg. to the consignee on an urgent basis, which was specifically informed to the respondents. On 22.07.1996, the goods were tendered to respondent no. 1 through respondent no. 2 after getting an assurance that the shipments will reach destination at Memphis within 7 days and delivery schedule was handed over to the appellant/complainant. As per the schedule, the entire consignment was supposed to reach at Memphis by 31.07.1996.

3. The consignments did not reach the destination at Memphis (USA) as per the delivery schedule. On enquiry, respondent no. 1 expressed its inability to deliver the consignments as per the delivery schedule provided to the  appellant and a revised delivery schedule was given on 05.08.1996, which mentioned the date of delivery on 06.08.1996. However, the consignment did not reach at the destination even as per the revised delivery schedule.

4. On non-receiving the goods, the consignee expressed its anguish by sending a letter dated 23.08.1996 and informed the complainant that the goods are not received in toto, and respondent no. 1 was unable to tell where the remaining cartons are.

5. It is also on record that 69 cartons were lying with Lufthansa. The respondent no. 1, by its letter dated 30.08.1996 addressed to respondent no. 2, accepted the short delivery. On 07.09.1996, the appellant/complainant made a modest claim against the respondents for refund of full freight. In response to the said claim, respondent no. 2 confirmed having short delivered 104 cartons out of 288 cartons but did not state whether the other cartons had arrived at the destination. The appellant served the legal notice dated 04.08.1997 on the respondents, which evoked no response. 

6. Ultimately, the appellant/complainant lodged a complaint before the NCDRC with the prayer that respondent no. 1 be  directed to refund a sum of Rs. 24,48,345/- being the fair charges for the consignments; pay a sum of Rs. 20 lakhs as compensation for loss of business and reputation; pay US$ 7042.00 being the value of the goods short delivered; pay interest @ 18% as well as cost of litigation, which was disposed of as abovesaid. Hence these appeals.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that admittedly, the shipments booked by the appellant on 24.07.1996, which were to be delivered by 31.07.1996, were delivered to the handling agent of the Consignee only in the month of September, 1996 from 03.09.1996 to 12.09.1996 with delay of more than 40 days.

8. Learned counsel submitted that the goods were tendered to respondent no. 1 on a specific representation that the same will be delivered within seven days, therefore, time is the essence of the contract between the parties. It is next argued that in the case in hand, it is clear from the material on record that respondent no. 1 has been highly negligent in rendering its services to the appellant.

9. Learned counsel further submits that once the NCDRC arrives at the conclusion that there is delay in delivery of consignment due to negligence of respondent no. 1, fair, just and reasonable compensation must be awarded in accordance with conditions of the contract and statutory provisions of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972.

10. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 submitted that there was no deficiency in service rendered by respondent no. 1. All reasonable care in performing its duties under the contract of carriage were discharged diligently. He would submit that no specific instructions were given by the appellant with regard to the time by which the consignments had to reach its destination, therefore, time was not the essence of contract entered into between the parties.

11. Learned counsel next submits that respondent no. 1 should not be held liable for delay in service, as in spite of being aware of the fact, the appellant sent the consignment through Kuwait Airways, which has various stops over at Kuwait, Chicago and Memphis, which would consume a lot of time period to deliver the consignment.

12. Learned counsel lastly submits that the compensationawarded by the NCDRC is excessive, unjust and unfair and is based on the conjectures and surmises.

13. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as the respondents at length and perused the material placed on record meticulously.

14. Initially, the NCDRC passed a final order on 21.05.2003 holding that there has been a short delivery of 104 pieces equal to 1822 Kgs. Therefore, in view of Rule 22 of Carriage by Air Act, multiplying this weight by US $ 20 per Kg., the amount payable work out to US $ 36440 which becomes payable by the respondent to the complainant for the loss of goods. This amount was directed to be paid by the respondent along with interest @ 9% from 01.10.1996. In so far as the issue concerning delay in delivering the consignment, the NCDRC found that in the absence of any communication emanating from the respondent No.1-Kuwait Airways promising to deliver the goods by any particular date, the plea raised by the complainant regarding delay in delivering the goods is not sustainable.

15. Challenging the above order dated 21.05.2003 of the NCDRC, the complainant preferred Civil Appeal bearing C.A.No. 8211 of 2003 which was allowed by this Court on 15.03.2011.  This Court observed that the issue concerning delay in delivery of goods has been decided by NCDRC without appreciating the material and evidence available on record. Resultantly, the matter was remitted back to NCDRC for fresh consideration of the complainant case vis-à-vis delay in delivering the consignment.

16. After the remand, the present impugned order has been passed holding that there was delay in delivering the consignment on time for which the complainant is entitled to compensation of 25037.5 Kg. multiplied by US $ 20 Kg. each which comes to US $ 500750 which exceed the sum of Rs. 20 lakhs claimed by the complainant therefore the complainant

was only entitled to have compensation of Rs. 20 lakhs along with interest @ 9% w.e.f. 31.07.1996 till its realization as also the litigation charges and compensation for harassment and mental agony in the sum of Rs. 5 lakhs.

17. Basing on the material available on record, the NCDRC has held that the fax message sent by respondent No.2-agent through whom the consignment was booked to be shipped by the respondent No.1 goes to show that the goods shall be delivered at Chicago Memphis on 29.07.1996, 31.07.1996 and 31.07.1996. However, when the consignment did not reach the destination, appellant - M/s Rajasthan Art Emporium informed the respondents whereafter, the respondent no. 2 provided a revised schedule, however, the shipments did not reach the destination even as per the revised schedule, according to which the goods were to reach the destination on 06.08.1996. 

18. The evidence on record shows that the parts of the shipments were received at Memphis on 30.08.1996 as admitted by the respondent No.1 in its letter dated 24.09.1996. Referring to the documents showing business relation between complainant and his buyer, the NCDRC would observe that the buyer was the largest customer of the complainant. Thus, the complainant has suffered huge loss due to transaction and the goods were received in the first week of September, 1996. 

19. We have perused and examined the material available on record and we are satisfied that the NCDRC has not committed any illegality or perversity in recording the finding that there was delay in delivery of consignment. As a matter of fact, it is an admitted position that the consignment which was booked on 24.07.1996, was delivered after one and a half month i.e. from 03.09.1996 to 12.09.1996.

20. In its reply before the NCDRC, the agent-respondent No.2  Dagga Air Agents) admitted that at the time of booking, the complainant was informed about the tentative date of arrival of goods at Memphis by 31.07.1996 and thereafter a revised schedule was also given to the complainant. Once the agent has issued a time schedule for delivery of consignment, it cannot be said that there is no material indicating that there was no agreement for delivery of the consignment in time. respondent no.1 – Kuwait Airways has never taken the stand in any of the communication arising from its office that the respondent No.2 is not its agents or that there was no agreement or promise by its agent that the consignment will be delivered in 07 days. The NCDRC has rightly noted that the appellant has paid air freight which is ten times more than the sea freight only to ensure that the consignment reaches its destination within a week because sea cargo would have taken 25 to 30 days for delivery and the appellant has paid such huge freight charges for ensuring early delivery, hence, the delay in delivery of consignment has necessarily inflicted damage to the appellant which is liable to be satisfied by the respondent No.1 as provided under Section 19 and 13(3) of the Carriage by Air Act 1972.

21. The provisions contained in Section 19 and 13 (3) of the Carriage by Air Act 1972 read as follows:

• 19. The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, luggage or goods.”

• “13 (3). If the carrier admits the loss of the goods, or if the goods have not arrived at the expiration of seven days after the date on which they ought to have arrived, the consignee is entitled to put into force against the carrier the rights which flow from the contract of carriage.”

By virtue of the above provisions, the consignee is entitled to seek damages for delay in delivering the consignment. It is not the case of the respondent No.1 that the respondent No.2 had acted beyond the terms of agency. Neither it is averred that the respondent no.2 was not the agent of respondent No.1. 

22. Section 186 of the Contract Act, 1872 provides that authority of an agent may be expressed or implied. Similarly, Section 188 of the Contract Act, 1872 prescribes that an agent,  having an authority to do an act, has authority to do every lawful thing which is necessary in order to do such act. In Dilawari Exporters v. Alitalia Cargo & Ors. [AIR 1991 SC 409]  this Court has observed in Paragraph 17 to 20 as follows: -

• “17. Section 186 of the Contract Act, 1872 (for short “the Contract Act”) lays down that the authority of an agent may be expressed or implied. As per Section 187 of the Contract Act, an authority is said to be express when it is given by words spoken or written, and an authority is said to be implied when it is to be inferred from the circumstances of the case; and things spoken or written, or the ordinary course of dealing, which may be accounted circumstances of the case. 

• 18. Section 188 of the Contract Act prescribes that:

• “188. Extent of agent's authority.—An agent, having an authority to do an act, has authority to do every lawful thing which is necessary in order to do such act.”

• 19. Section 237 of the Contract Act provides that:

• “237. Liability of principal inducing belief that agent's unauthorised acts were authorised.—When an agent has, without authority, done acts or incurred obligations to third persons on behalf of his principal, the principal is bound by such acts or obligations if he has by his words or conduct induced such third persons to believe that such acts and  obligations were within the scope of the agent's authority.”

• 20. There is no gainsaying that onus to show that the act done by an agent was within the scope of his authority or ostensible authority held or exercised by him is on the person claiming against the principal. This, of course, can be shown by practice as well as by a written instrument. Thus, the question for consideration is whether on the evidence obtaining in the instant case, can it be said that Respondent 3 had an express or implied authority to act on behalf of Respondent 1 as their agent? If Respondent 3 had such an authority, then obviously Respondent 1 was bound by the commitment Respondent 3 had made to the appellant.”

23. In the case at hand, in the absence of a plea by the respondent No.1, that the respondent no. 2 was not its agent or that he had no authority to give schedule of delivery of

consignment, the onus has not been discharged. Therefore, the respondent No.1 is bound by the promise held by its agent - respondent No.2, that the goods shall be delivered within one week and when the time schedule expired and the goods were, in fact, delivered after one and a half month, there was negligent delay in delivery of consignment. 

24. The grievance of the appellant in this appeal is mainly on account of the NCDRC not allowing the entire claim for compensation by calculating the total weight of the subject consignment at 2507.5 Kg. multiplied by US $ 20 per Kg. According to the appellant, in view of Rule 22 (2) of Schedule-III of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 (as amended by the Hague Protocol) the amount thus calculated would exceed the sum of Rs. 20 lakhs. The appellant would thus claim the entire amount equivalent to US $ 50070 without limiting it to Rs. 20 lakhs. However, on this point also, we approve and sustain the order passed by the NCDRC for the reason that in its complaint under Section 21(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the complainant/appellant has sought damages for Rs. 20 lakhs only as compensation for loss of business and reputation. It is a trite law that a party is not entitled to seek relief which he has not prayed for. For this proposition we may profitably refer to this Court’s judgments in 

• Merrrs. Trojan & Co. Vs. RM.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar [AIR 1953 SC 235], 

• Krishna Priya Ganguly etc. etc. Vs. University of Lucknow & Ors [AIR 1984 SC 186,]., 

• Om Prakash & Ors. Vs. Ram Kumar & Ors [AIR 1991 SC 409]., 

• Bharat Amratlal Kothari Vs. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi & Ors [AIR 1991 SC 409]., 

• Manohar Lal (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Ugrasen (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors.[AIR 1991 SC 409]

25. In view of the forgoing reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with the Order passed by the NCDRC and resultantly both the Civil Appeals deserve to be and are hereby dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of

-------------------------------------------