Tuesday, 11 August 2026

The Doctrine of "Debts due and payable"

 This article is with particular reference to “Debts due and payable” in context to Claims filed by creditors with IRP/RP in response to public announcement. 

1. Definitions under Section 3 of the Code;

# Section 3(6) “claim” means; –

(a) a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;

(b) right to remedy for breach of contract under any law for the time being in force, if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured;

# Section 3(11) “debt” means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a financial debt and operational debt;

# Section 3(12) “default” means non-payment of debt when whole or any part or instalment of the amount of debt has become due and payable and is not 1[paid] by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be;

 

# Section 238A. Limitation. – The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings or appeals before the Adjudicating Authority, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.

 

What is conspicuous by its absence in this Section (238A) are the expressions “under this Act” or “subject to the provisions of this Act”. Thus Section 238A restricts the application of The Limitation Act to the proceedings or appeals before the Adjudicating Authority, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal only.

 

2. Important SCI judgements on Limitation & debts due and payable.

i). SCI (20.12.1957) in Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 167 of 1954) held that;

“ . . . On this, the question arises for consideration whether a debt which is time-barred can be the subject of transfer, and if it can be, how it can benefit the Board to take it over if it cannot be realised by process of law. Now, it is the settled law of this country that the statute of Limitation only bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt. Section 28 of the Limitation Act provides that when the period limited to a person for instituting a suit for possession of any property has expired, his right to such property is extinguished. And the authorities have held-and rightly, that when the property is incapable of possession, as for example, a debt, the section has no application, and lapse of time does not extinguish the right of a person thereto. Under S. 25(3) of the Contract Act, a barred debt is good consideration for a fresh promise to pay the amount. When a debtor makes a payment without any direction as to how it is to be appropriated, the creditor has the right to appropriate it towards a barred debt. (Vide s. 60 of the Contract Act). It has also been held that a creditor is entitled to recover the debt from the surety, even though a suit on it is barred against the principal debtor. .  . .”

 

ii). Hon’ble SCI (20.04.1992) Punjab National Bank And Ors vs Surendra Prasad Sinha (Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1992.) held that;

“. . . . The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. Section 3 of the Limitation Act 36 of 1963, for short "the Act" only bars the remedy, but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. The right to the debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by the limitation. Only exception in which the remedy also becomes barred by limitation is that right itself is destroyed. For example under s.27 of the Act a suit for possession of any property becoming barred by limitation, the right to property itself is destroyed. Except in such cases which are specially provided under the right to which remedy relates in other case the right subsists. Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process is barred under S.3 read with the relevant Article in the schedule, the right to debt remains. The time barred debt does not cease to exist by reasons of S.3. That right can be exercised in any other manner than by means of a suit. The debt is not extinguished, but the remedy to enforce the liability is destroyed. What S.3 refers is only to the remedy but not to the right of the creditors. Such debt continues to subsists so long as it is not paid. It is not obligatory to file a suit to recover the debt. It is settled law that the creditor would be entitled to adjust, from the payment of a sum by a debtor, towards the time barred debt. It is also equally settled law that the creditor when he is in possession of an adequate security, the debt due could be adjusted from the security in his possession and custody. . . .”

 

iii). SCI (11.10.2018) in B.K. Educational Services Private Limited Vs. Parag Gupta and Associates [Civil Appeal  No.23988 of 2017] observed as under;

# 19. Shri Dholakia also referred to and relied upon Section 60 and 61 of the Contract Act which are set out hereunder:

  • “60. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is not indicated.—Where the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits. 

  • 61. Application of payment where neither party appropriates.—Where neither party makes any appropriation the payment shall be applied in discharge of the debts in order of time, whether they are or are not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits. If the debts are of equal standing, the payment shall be applied in discharge of each proportionably.”

These Sections also recognize the fact that limitation bars the remedy but not the right. In the context in which Section 60 appears, it is interesting to note that Section 60 uses the phrase “actually due and payable to him….” whether its recovery is or is not barred by the limitation law. The expression “actually” makes it clear that in fact a debt must be due and payable notwithstanding the law of limitation. From this, it is very difficult to infer that in the context of the Contract Act, the expression “due and payable” by itself would connote an amount that may be due even though it is time-barred, for otherwise, it would be unnecessary for Section 60 to contain the word “actually” together with the later words, “whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits”.

# 20. Shri Dholakia went on to cite Bhimsen Gupta v. Bishwanath Prasad Gupta, (2004) 4 SCC 95, and In re Sir Harilal Nemchand Gosalia, AIR 1950 Bom 74 for the proposition that debts “due and payable” must be differentiated from debts “due and recoverable”. . . . . .

Similarly, in Sir Harilal Nemchand Gosalia (supra), the expression used is “amount of debts due and owing from the deceased, payable by law out of the estate” which appeared in the third schedule of the Court Fee Act, 1870. It was held that an executor of a will is entitled to pay time-barred debts and cannot be confused with a creditor who may sue the executor in relation to those debts. The creditor would fail in his action because although the debt subsists, the remedy has been extinguished due to the law of limitation. Since the executor is duty bound to pay the amounts due and owing under the will without going to Court, he is entitled to pay a time-barred debt. This, the Court held, is made clear by Section 323 of the Succession Act, 1925, which made no exception in case of time-barred debts. It is in this context that the Court noted the difference between “payable” and “recoverable”.

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3. In light of the definition of the “claim” & other provisions of the Code read with the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in various judgements mentioned supra above, it can be safely deduced that the claims received during CIRP are "Debts Due and Payable", irrespective of limitation.

 

4. NCLAT (31.07.2019) in Sunil Kumar Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority & Ors. [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 775 of 2019] held that;

  • ‘we find that the ‘Interim Resolution Professional’ is already directed to examine the claim of the NOIDA, who is the Applicant before the Adjudicating Authority and no final decision has been taken and the Adjudicating Authority has made it clear that the claim of the NOIDA cannot be rejected on the ground that it is time barred or the claim is by an entity other than the ‘financial Creditor’

 

Disclaimer: The sole purpose of this article is to create awareness on the subject and must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision. A reader must do his own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this article.

 

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Claims of a Creditor during Insolvency of Corporate Guarantor

 Claims of a Creditor during Insolvency of Corporate Guarantor


Query: A Corporate Guarantor (CD) to a credit facility goes into CIRP. During its CIRP the Principal Debtor defaults and now the creditor wants to go after the Corporate Guarantor/CD. In the background of Ghanshyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited’ Vs. ‘Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited’, (2021) 9 SCC 657, two questions arise: 

  1. Can the creditor invoke a guarantee as against a CD/CG which is under CIRP (i.e) covered by a moratorium? 

  2. Can a claim be accepted by the RP of CD/CG without invocation of the  guarantee?


The questions have to be answered ensuring that the creditor is not left remedy-less.


The above questions have many dimensions.


a.

Whether insolvency of Principal Debtor can be initiated only after recall of the loan or it can be initiated on the basis of debt & default only. 

Insolvency can be initiated on the basis of debt & default, with or without recall of the Loan.

b.

Whether insolvency of Corporate Guarantor can be initiated without invoking the Corporate guarantee, i.e. on the basis of debt & default of the principal borrower.



Depends upon the terms of guarantee, whether the invocation has been waived in the guarantee contract or not.


Guarantor’s liability is co-extensive with that of borrower (Section 128 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872} 

c.

Impact of recalling the Loan

Entire amount of the loan becomes due, instead of  overdue repayment instalment.

d.

Whether guarantee can be invoked prior to the recalling of the loan of Principal Debtor.


Prior to the recall of the Loan only  instalments due as per the contract can be proceeded against.

Guarantee can be invoked only for the sum which is legally due and recoverable from the principal debtor.


Supreme Court of India (10.04.2006) in Syndicate Bank vs Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors. [Appeal (civil) 6894 of 1997] held that;

# 14. We have to, however, enter a caveat here. When the demand is made by the creditor on the guarantor, under a guarantee which requires a demand, as a condition precedent for the liability of the guarantor, such demand should be for payment of a sum which is legally due and recoverable from the principal debtor. If the debt had already become time-barred against the principal debtor, the question of creditor demanding payment thereafter, for the first time, against the guarantor would not arise.

e.

Whether invocation of the guarantee is necessary before a creditor can file a claim under the guarantee irrespective of the nature/terms of the guarantee/contract.

No - Section 5(8)(i) read with section 3(6)(b)

f.

Can the creditor invoke a guarantee as against a CD/CG which is under CIRP (i.e) covered by a moratorium? 

Invocation of a guarantee is a unilateral action & is meaning less during moratorium. Evan after invocation creditor can not proceed against CD/CG during moratorium.


Provisions of Statutes 

Co-existence of liability of borrower & guarantor

Section 128 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872

# 128. Surety’s liability.—The liability of the surety is co- extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract.

Illustration

A guarantees to B the payment of a bill of exchange by C, the acceptor. The bill is dishonoured by C. A is liable, not only for the amount of the bill, but also for any interest and charges which may have become due on it.


Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016

 # 3(6) “claim” means –

  • (a) a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;

  • (b) right to remedy for breach of contract under any law for the time being in force, if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured;

# 3(11) “debt” means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a financial debt and operational debt;

# 3(12) “default” means non-payment of debt when whole or any part or instalment of the amount of debt has become due and payable and is not 1[paid] by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be;

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Case Law;

1). NCLAT (26.04.2023) In Archana Deepak Wani Vs. Indian Bank.[Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.301 of 2023] held that;

  • The liability of the guarantor being coextensive with the principal borrower under Section 128 of the Contract Act, it triggers the moment principal borrower commits default in paying the acknowledged debt. This is a legal fiction. Such liability of the guarantor would flow from the guarantee deed and memorandum of mortgage, unless it expressly provides to the contrary.

  • A guarantor’s liability depends on terms of his contract. There can be default by the Principal Borrower and the Guarantor on the same date or date of default for both may be different depending on the terms of contract of guarantee.

  • It is well settled that the loan agreement with the Principal Borrower and the Bank as well as Deed of Guarantee between the Bank and the Guarantor are two different transactions and the Guarantor’s liability has to be read from the Deed of Guarantee.

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2). NCLAT (12.07.2022) in IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited Vs. Mr. Abhinav Mukherji & Ors.  [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 356 & 358 of 2022] held that;

  • # 26. It is pertinent to mention that the aforenoted Judgement ‘Axis Bank Limited’ (Supra) relied heavily upon by the Appellants has been overruled by this Tribunal in the subsequent decision in the case ofEdelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited’ Vs. ‘Orissa Manganese and Minerals Ltd.’, 2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 764. Even ‘Andhra Bank Vs. M/s. F.M. Hammerle Textiles Ltd.’, (Supra) is not applicable in view of the subsequent decision. The Hon’ble Supreme Court inGhanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited’ Vs. ‘Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited’, (2021) 9 SCC 657, (Supra), has addressed to this issue. It is pertinent to reproduce the relevant paras with respect to invocation of Corporate Guarantee as hereunder:

  • “102. NCLT found that by email dated 6-1-2018 EARC had submitted its claim in Form “C’ for an amount of Rs 648,89,62,395. In response to the said email, RP sought a clarification as to whether the corporate guarantee had been invoked by the applicant. RP had not received any response till 21-2-2018 from EARC. Despite repeated requests made by RP, EARC did not respond to the query made by RP. From the record placed before NCLT, it was clear that EARC had not invoked the corporate guarantee. NCLT therefore posed a question to itself, as to whether an uninvoked corporate guarantee could be considered as matured claim of the applicant. NCLT found that once the moratorium was applied under Section 14 of the I&B Code, EARC was prevented from invoking the corporate guarantee. NCLT further found that the OMML’s guarantee had not been invoked by EARC till the date of completion of CIRP process and once the moratorium was imposed, it could not invoke the corporate guarantee. NCLT therefore found that there is no illegality or irregularity in not admitting the claim of EARC.

  • XXXXXX

  • 119. It is to be noted that in the appeal before NCLAT, EXIM Bank as well as Axis Bank had taken steps immediately after the claim of the said Banks on the basis of corporate guarantee came to be rejected by RP/CoC. After rejection of the claim, the said Banks had filed an application under Section 60(5) before NCLT. On NCLT rejecting the said claim, those Banks had approached NCLAT in appeals which were allowed and the order, as stated hereinabove, was passed.

  • XXXXX

  • 125. We are therefore of the considered view that the appeal deserves to be allowed by expunging paragraphs 28, 42, 43, 51 and 52 from the judgement of NCLAT dated 23-4-2019. It is ordered accordingly. The judgement and order passed by NCLT dated 22-6-2018 is upheld. No costs.”       (Emphasis Supplied)

  • # 27. It is seen from the aforenoted Judgement that an uninvoked Corporate Guarantee cannot be considered as a ‘Matured Claim’. In para 133 of the aforenoted Judgement the Hon’ble Supreme Court has upheld the finding of the Adjudicating Authority that once the moratorium was applied under Section 14 of the Code, a Corporate Guarantee cannot be invoked. Though this is a case where the Resolution Plan has been approved, the fact remains that the Principle that a Corporate Guarantee cannot be invoked once the CIRP has commenced and that an uninvoked Corporate Guarantee as on date of filing of the Claim, cannot be considered as ‘Matured Claim’ has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.


Blogger’s comments; The main thrust in IDBI Trusteeship Services (supra) is about the maturity of claim in respect of guarantee which has not been invoked. As per the definition provided in the Code “debt” is a claim which is due (i.e. is matured). One has to distinguish between the Debt for which insolvency can be initiated in case of default, whereas the claim represents right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured; [Section 3(6)] 


The Hon’ble Supreme Court inGhanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited’ Vs. ‘Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited’, (2021) 9 SCC 657, (Supra), has upheld the orders of NCLT as EARC filed application after the approval of the resolution plan & claim of EARC if admitted the voting percentage would not have altered the outcome of decision of CoC for approval of the resolution plan.


The purpose of collation of claims during insolvency is to assess the total liabilities of the CD for resolution of the insolvency. 

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3). NCLAT (24.11.2020) in “State Bank of India Vs. Athena Energy Ventures Pvt. Ltd." [(2020) SCC online NCLAT 774] held that,

  • # 13. . . . . . . . . .If the above provisions of Section 60 (2) and (3) are kept in view, it can be said that IBC has no aversion to simultaneously proceeding against the Corporate Debtor and Corporate Guarantor. If two Applications can be filed, for the same amount against Principal Borrower and Guarantor keeping in view the above provisions, the Applications can also be maintained. It is for such reason that Sub-Section (3) of Section 60 provides that if insolvency resolution process or liquidation or bankruptcy proceedings of a Corporate Guarantor or Personal Guarantor as the case may be of the Corporate Debtor is pending in any Court or Tribunal, it shall stand transferred to the Adjudicating Authority dealing with insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of such Corporate Debtor. Apparently and for obvious reasons, the law requires that both the proceedings should be before same Adjudicating Authority.” . . . . . . . .

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4). NCLAT (14.08.2018) In Export Import Bank of India and Ors. vs. Resolution Professional JEKPL Private Limited and Ors. [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 304 of 2017,],

  • # 54. Therefore, stand taken by the respondents that the claim has not been matured cannot be ground to reject the claim.

  • # 55. Section 25 provides the duties of Resolution Professional. As per Section 25(2)(e), the Resolution Professional is required to maintai  updated list of all the claims. Aforesaid fact also suggests that the maturity of a claim or default of debt are not the guiding factors to be noticed for collating or updating the claims. The matter can be looked from another angle. It is only in case of ‘debt’ and ‘default’, a ‘Financial Creditor’ or ‘Operational Creditor’, may file applications under Section 7 or 9. The ‘Corporate Applicant’ has also right to file application under Section 10 for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against itself, if it has defaulted to pay the ‘debt’. It does not mean that the persons whose debt has not been matured cannot file claim. The ‘Financial Creditors’ or ‘Operational Creditors’ or ‘secured or unsecured creditors’ all are entitled to file claim.

  • # 56. Therefore, we hold that maturity of claim or default of claim or invocation of guarantee for claiming the amount has no nexus with filing of claim pursuant to public announcement made under Section 13(1)(b) r/w Section 15(1)(c) or for collating the claim under Section 18(1)(b) or for updating claim under Section 25(2)(e). For the purpose of collating information relating to assets, finances and operations of Corporate Debtor or financial position of the Corporate Debtor, including the liabilities as on the date of initiation of the Resolution Process as per Section 18(1), it is the duty of the Resolution Professional to collate all the claims and to verify the same from the records of assets and liabilities maintained by the Corporate Debtor.

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5). NCLAT (13.07.2018) in Andhra Bank vs. M/s. F. M. Hammerle Textile Ltd. [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 61 of 2018] held that;

  • # 9. It is not necessary that all the claims as are submitted by the Creditor should be a claim matured on the date of initiation of Resolution Process/admission, even in respect of debt, which is due in future on its maturity, the ‘Financial Creditor’ or ‘Operational Creditor’ or ‘Secured Creditor’ or ‘Unsecured Creditor’ can file such claim. Therefore, the definition of ‘Claim’ as defined under Section 3(6) is to be read along with Section 13 read with Section 15 of the ‘I&B Code’.

  • # 11. For example, if there is a default, a ‘Financial Creditor’ or ‘Operational Creditor’ may file application under Sections 7 or 9 for initiation of ‘Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process’. Once it is initiated, order of ‘Moratorium’ is passed and the advertisement is issued all claimants whether his claim is matured or not are supposed to file claim before the ‘Resolution Professional’. The ‘Resolution Professional’ cannot reject one or other claim on the ground that only the person whose claim has been matured can be looked into and other claim not matured cannot be entertained.

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6). Supreme Court of India (10.04.2006) in Syndicate Bank vs Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors. [Appeal (civil) 6894 of 1997] held that;

  • # 9. A guarantor's liability depends upon the terms of his contract. A 'continuing guarantee' is different from an ordinary guarantee. There is also a difference between a guarantee which stipulates that the guarantor is liable to pay only on a demand by the creditor, and a guarantee which does not contain such a condition. Further, depending on the terms of guarantee, the liability of a guarantor may be limited to a particular sum, instead of the liability being to the same extent as that of the principal debtor. The liability to pay may arise, on the principal debtor and guarantor, at the same time or at different points of time. A claim may be even time-barred against the principal debtor, but still enforceable against the guarantor. The parties may agree that the liability of a guarantor shall arise at a later point of time than that of the principal debtor. We have referred to these aspects only to underline the fact that the extent of liability under a guarantee as also the question as to when the liability of a guarantor will arise, would depend purely on the terms of the contract.

  • # 13. What then is the meaning of the said words used in the guarantee bonds in question? The guarantee bond states that the guarantors agree to pay and satisfy the Bank 'on demand'. It specifically provides that the liability to pay interest would arise upon the guarantor only from the date of demand by the Bank for payment. It also provides that the guarantee shall be a continuing guarantee for payment of the ultimate balance to become due to the Bank by the borrower. The terms of guarantee, thus, make it clear that the liability to pay would arise on the guarantors only when a demand is made. Article 55 provides that the time will begin to run when the contract is 'broken'. Even if Article 113 is to be applied, the time begins to run only when the right to sue accrues. In this case, the contract was broken and the right to sue accrued only when a demand for payment was made by the Bank and it was refused by the guarantors. When a demand is made requiring payment within a stipulated period, say 15 days, the breach occurs or right to sue accrues, if payment is not made or is refused within 15 days. If while making the demand for payment, no period is stipulated within which the payment should be made, the breach occurs or right to sue accrues, when the demand is served on the guarantor.

  • # 14. We have to, however, enter a caveat here. When the demand is made by the creditor on the guarantor, under a guarantee which requires a demand, as a condition precedent for the liability of the guarantor, such demand should be for payment of a sum which is legally due and recoverable from the principal debtor. If the debt had already become time-barred against the principal debtor, the question of creditor demanding payment thereafter, for the first time, against the guarantor would not arise. When the demand is made against the guarantor, if the claim is a live claim (that is, a claim which is not barred) against the principal debtor, limitation in respect of the guarantor will run from the date of such demand and refusal/non compliance. Where guarantor becomes liable in pursuance of a demand validly made in time, the creditor can sue the guarantor within three years, even if the claim against the principal debtor gets subsequently time-barred. To clarify the above, the following illustration may be useful :

  • Let us say that a creditor makes some advances to a borrower between 10.4.1991 and 1.6.1991 and the repayment thereof is guaranteed by the guarantor undertaking to pay on demand by the creditor, under a continuing guarantee dated 1.4.1991. Let us further say a demand is made by the creditor against the guarantor for payment on 1.3.1993. Though the limitation against the principal debtor may expire on 1.6.1994, as the demand was made on 1.3.1993 when the claim was 'live' against the principal debtor, the limitation as against the guarantor would be 3 years from 1.3.1993. On the other hand, if the creditor does not make a demand at all against the guarantor till 1.6.1994 when the claims against the principal debtor get time-barred, any demand against the guarantor made thereafter say on 15.9.1994 would not be valid or enforceable.

  • Be that as it may.


Disclaimer: The sole purpose of this blog is to create awareness on the subject and must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision. A reader must do his own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this blog.

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