Tuesday, 18 March 2025

Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd. - A continuing wrong arises where there is an obligation imposed by law, agreement or otherwise to continue to act or to desist from acting in a particular manner.

 SCI (2022.01.11) In Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd. [Civil Appeal No 4000 of 2019] held that;

  • It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury.

  • In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that Section 23 can be invoked.

  • The distinctive nature of a continuing wrong is that the law that is violated makes the wrongdoer continuously liable for penalty. A wrong or default which is complete but whose effect may continue to be felt even after its completion is, however, not a continuing wrong or default.

  • “What is a continuing cause of action? Speaking accurately, there is no such thing; but what is called a continuing cause of action is a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought.

  • The true principle appears to be that where the wrong complained of is the omission to perform a positive duty requiring a person to do a certain act the test to determine whether such a wrong is a continuing one is whether the duty in question is one which requires him to continue to do that act. Breach of a covenant to keep the premises in good repair, breach of a continuing guarantee, obstruction to a right of way, obstruction to the right of a person to the unobstructed flow of water, refusal by a man to maintain his wife and children whom he is bound to maintain under law and the carrying on of mining operations or the running of a factory without complying with the measures intended for the safety and well-being of workmen

  • A continuing wrong arises where there is an obligation imposed by law, agreement or otherwise to continue to act or to desist from acting in a particular manner.

  • For a continuing wrong to arise, there must in the first place be a wrong which is actionable because in the absence of a wrong, there can be no continuing wrong. It is when there is a wrong that a further line of enquiry of whether there is a continuing wrong would arise.

The Limitation Act, 1963.

# “22. Continuing breaches and torts.—In the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues.”


Excerpts of the Order;

# 12 Section 22 of the Limitation Act 1963provides for the computation of limitation in the case of a continuing breach of contract or tort. It provides that in case of a continuing breach of contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of time during which the breach continues. This Court in Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan [AIR 1959 SC 798] elaborated on when a continuous cause of action arises. Speaking for the three-judge Bench, Justice PB Gajendragadkar (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that

  • “31. […] Does the conduct of the trustees amount to a continuing wrong under Section 23? That is the question which this contention raises for our decision. In other words, did the cause of action arise de die in diem as claimed by the appellants? In dealing with this argument it is necessary to bear in mind that Section 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that Section 23 can be invoked.” (emphasis supplied)


The Court held that the act of the trustees to deny the rights of Guravs as hereditary worshippers and dispossessing them through a decree of the court was not a continuing wrong. Although the continued dispossession caused damage to the appellants, the injury to their rights was complete when they were evicted.


# 13 In CWT v. Suresh Seth [(1981) 2 SCC 790] a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question of whether a default in filing a return under the Wealth Tax Act amounted to a continuing wrong. Justice ES Venkataramiah (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that:

  • “11. […] The distinctive nature of a continuing wrong is that the law that is violated makes the wrongdoer continuously liable for penalty. A wrong or default which is complete but whose effect may continue to be felt even after its completion is, however, not a continuing wrong or default. It is reasonable to take the view that the court should not be eager to hold that an act or omission is a continuing wrong or default unless there are words in the statute concerned which make out that such was the intention of the legislature. In the instant case whenever the question of levying penalty arises what has to be first considered is whether the assessee has failed without reasonable cause of file the return as required by law and if it is held that he has failed to do so then penalty has to be levied in accordance with the measure provided in the Act. When the default is the filing of delayed return the penalty may be correlated to the time-lag between the last day for filing it without penalty and the day on which it is filed and the quantum of tax or wealth involved in the case for purposes of determining the quantumof penalty but the default however is only one which takes place on the expiry of the last day for filing the return without penalty and not a continuing one. The default in question does not, however, give rise to a fresh cause of action every day. Explaining the expression “a continuing cause of action” Lord Lindley in Hole v. Chard Union [(1894) 1 Ch D 293 : 63 LJ Ch 469 : 70 LT 52] observed:

  • What is a continuing cause of action? Speaking accurately, there is no such thing; but what is called a continuing cause of action is a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought.” (emphasis supplied)


The Court further provided illustrations of continuous wrongs:

  • “17. The true principle appears to be that where the wrong complained of is the omission to perform a positive duty requiring a person to do a certain act the test to determine whether such a wrong is a continuing one is whether the duty in question is one which requires him to continue to do that act. Breach of a covenant to keep the premises in good repair, breach of a continuing guarantee, obstruction to a right of way, obstruction to the right of a person to the unobstructed flow of water, refusal by a man to maintain his wife and children whom he is bound to maintain under law and the carrying on of mining operations or the running of a factory without complying with the measures intended for the safety and well-being of workmen may be illustrations of continuing breaches or wrongs giving rise to civil or criminal liability, as the case may be, de die in diem.”


# 14 In M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das [(2020) 1 SCC 1] a Constitution Bench of this Court (of which one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) was a part) examined the precedents with regards to a continuing wrong. The Court observed that:

  • “343. The submission of Nirmohi Akhara is based on the principle of continuing wrong as a defence to a plea of limitation. In assessing the submission, a distinction must be made between the source of a legal injury and the effect of the injury. The source of a legal injury is founded in a breach of an obligation. A continuing wrong arises where there is an obligation imposed by law, agreement or otherwise to continue to act or to desist from acting in a particular manner. The breach of such an obligation extends beyond a single completed act or omission. The breach is of a continuing nature, giving rise to a legal injury which assumes the nature of a continuing wrong. For a continuing wrong to arise, there must in the first place be a wrong which is actionable because in the absence of a wrong, there can be no continuing wrong. It is when there is a wrong that a further line of enquiry of whether there is a continuing wrong would arise. Without a wrong there cannot be a continuing wrong. A wrong postulates a breach of an obligation imposed on an individual, whether positive or negative, to act or desist from acting in a particular manner. The obligation on one individual finds a corresponding reflection of a right which inheres in another. A continuing wrong postulates a breach of a continuing duty or a breach of an obligation which is of a continuing nature. […]

  • Hence, in evaluating whether there is a continuing wrong within the meaning of Section 23, the mere fact that the effect of the injury caused has continued, is not sufficient to constitute it as a continuing wrong. For instance, when the wrong is complete as a result of the act or omission which is complained of, no continuing wrong arises even though the effect or damage that is sustained may enure in the future. What makes a wrong, a wrong of a continuing nature is the breach of a duty which has not ceased but which continues to subsist. The breach of such a duty creates a continuing wrong and hence a defence to a plea of limitation.” (emphasis supplied)


# 15 A continuing wrong occurs when a party continuously breaches an obligation imposed by law or agreement. Section 3 of the MOFA imposes certain general obligations on a promoter. These obligations inter alia include making disclosures on the nature of title to the land, encumbrances on the land, fixtures, fittings and amenities to be provided, and to not grant possession of a flat until a completion certificate is given by the local authority. The responsibility to obtain the occupancy certificate from the local authority has also been imposed under the agreement to sell between the members of the appellant and the respondent on the latter.


# 16 Section 6 of the MOFA make the promoter responsible for payments of outgoings till the property is transferred. Section 6 reads as follows:

  • “A promoter shall, while he is in possession and where he collects from persons who have taken over flats or are to take over flats sums for the payment of outgoings even thereafter, pay all outgoings (including ground rent, municipal or other local taxes, on income taxes, water charges, electricity charges, revenue assessment, interest on any mortgage or other encumbrances, if any), until he transfers the property to the persons taking over the flats, or to the organisation of any such persons, [where any promoter fails to pay all or any of the outgoings collected by him from the persons who have taken over flats or are to take over flats, before transferring the property to the persons taking over the flats or to the organisation of any such persons, the promoter shall continue to be liable, even after the transfer of the property, to pay such outgoings and penal charges (if any) to the authority or person to whom they are payable and to be responsible for any legal proceedings which may be taken therefor by such authority or persons.]”  (emphasis supplied)


# 17 Sections 3 and 6 of the MOFA indicate that the promoter has an obligation to provide the occupancy certificate to the flat owners. Apart from this, the promoter must make payments of outgoings such as ground rent, municipal taxes, water charges and electricity charges till the time the property is transferred to the flat-owners. Where the promoter fails to pay such charges, the promoter is liable even after the transfer of property .


# 18 Based on these provisions, it is evident that there was an obligation on the respondent to provide the occupancy certificate and pay for the relevant charges till the certificate has been provided. The respondent has time and again failed to provide the occupancy certificate to the appellant society. For this reason, a complaint was instituted in 1998 by the appellant against the respondent. The NCDRC on 20 August 2014 directed the respondent to obtain the certificate within a period of four months. Further, the NCDRC also imposed a penalty for any the delay in obtaining the occupancy certificate beyond these 4 months. Since 2014 till date, the respondent has failed to provide the occupancy certificate. Owing to the failure of the respondent to obtain the certificate, there has been a direct impact on the members of the appellant in terms of the payment of higher taxes and water charges to the municipal authority. This continuous failure to obtain an occupancy certificate is a breach of the obligations imposed on the respondent under the MOFA and amounts to a continuing wrong. The appellants therefore, are entitled to damages arising out of this continuing wrong and their complaint is not barred by limitation. 

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Monday, 17 March 2025

Imp. Rulings - Completion Certificate & Offer for Possession

 Imp. Rulings - Completion Certificate & Offer for Possession

Index;

  1. REAT UP (2024.09.14) in Abha Khanna (IPE) Vs. KVG Realtech Pvt. Ltd. [(2024) ibclaw.in 133 REAT, Appeal No. 243/2020

  2. SCI (2023.09.06) in Dharmendra Sharma v. Agra Development Authority [Civil Appeal Nos.2809-2810 Of 2024]

  3. SCI (2023.02.09) In Debashis Sinha vs M/s R.N.R Enterprise & Ors. [Civil Appeal Nos. 3343 OF 2020, Neutral Citation 2024 INSC 667] 

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Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016.

Transfer of title.

# 17. (1) The promoter shall execute a registered conveyance deed in favour of the allottee along with the undivided proportionate title in the common areas to the association of the allottees or the competent authority, as the case may be, and hand over the physical possession of the plot, apartment of building, as the case may be, to the allottees and the common areas to the association of the allottees or the competent authority, as the case may be, in a real estate project, and the other title documents pertaining thereto within specified period as per sanctioned plans as provided under the local laws:

Provided that, in the absence of any local law, conveyance deed in favour of the allottee or the association of the allottees or the competent authority, as the case may be, under this section shall be carried out by the promoter within three months from date of issue of occupancy certificate.

(2) After obtaining the occupancy certificate and handing over physical possession to the allottees in terms of sub-section (1), it shall be the responsibility of the promoter to handover the necessary documents and plans, including common areas, to the association of the allottees or the competent authority, as the case may be, as per the local laws:

Provided that, in the absence of any local law, the promoter shall handover the necessary documents and plans, including common areas, the association of the allottees or the competent authority, as the case may be, within thirty days after obtaining the occupancy certificate.


Return of amount and compensation.

# 18. (1) If the promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment, plot or building,—

(a) in accordance with the terms of the agreement for sale or, as the case may be, duly completed by the date specified therein; or

(b) due to discontinuance of his business as a developer on account of suspension or revocation of the registration under this Act or for any other reason, he shall be liable on demand to the allottees, in case the allottee wishes to withdraw from the project, without prejudice to any other remedy available, to return the amount received by him in respect of that apartment, plot, building, as the case may be, with interest at such rate as may be prescribed in this behalf including compensation in the manner as provided under this Act:

Provided that where an allottee does not intend to withdraw from the project, he shall be paid, by the promoter, interest for every month of delay, till the handing over of the possession, at such rate as may be prescribed.

(2) The promoter shall compensate the allottees in case of any loss caused to him due to defective title of the land, on which the project is being developed or has been developed, in the manner as provided under this Act, and the claim for compensation under this subsection shall not be barred by limitation provided under any law for the time being in force.


Rights & Duties of of Allottees

# 19. (1) The allottee shall be entitled to obtain the information relating to sanctioned plans, layout plans along with the specifications, approved by the competent authority and such other information as provided in this Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder or the agreement for sale signed with the promoter.

XXXX

(10) Every allottee shall take physical possession of the apartment, plot or building as the case may be, within a period of two months of the occupancy certificate issued for the said apartment, plot or building, as the case may be.

(11) Every allottee shall participate towards registration of the conveyance deed of the apartment, plot or building, as the case may be, as provided under sub-section (1) of section 17 of this Act.

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1). REAT UP (2024.09.14) in Abha Khanna (IPE) Vs. KVG Realtech Pvt. Ltd. [(2024) ibclaw.in 133 REAT, Appeal No. 243/2020] held that; 

  • The issue of offering handing over possession prior to obtaining occupancy certificate was also examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 1232 and 1443-1444 of 2019 R.V. Prasannakumaar and ors. Vs. Mantri Castles Pvt. Ltd. and ors. decided on 11.02.2019 wherein it has been observed that possession cannot be handed over prior to obtaining occupancy certificate. 

  • That as per the provisions of the U.P. Apartments Act, 2010 read with the provisions of Act, 2016  a  Promoter is required to offer legal and habitable possession to the allottees only after obtaining OC/CC and ask for clearing dues by raising final demand.

  • The failure of the Developer to comply with the contractual obligation to provide the flat within the contractually stipulated period, would amount to a deficiency of service. Given the one-sided nature of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement, the consumer fora had the jurisdiction to award just and reasonable compensation as an incident of the power to direct removal of deficiency in service.

  • That the right so given to the allottee is unqualified and if availed, the money deposited by the allottee has to be refunded with interest at such rate as may be prescribed and the

  • Proviso to Section 18(1) contemplates a situation where the allottee does not intend to withdraw from the Project. In that case he is entitled to and must be paid interest for every month of delay till the handing over of the possession.

  • It is upto the allottee to proceed either under Section 18(1) or under proviso to Section 18(1).

  • If an allottee chooses to remain in the project and in case the allottee seeks refund then he is entitled for interest on the deposited amount and/or compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act 2016, which in our considered view will be in accordance with the principles of equity as well.

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2). SCI (2023.09.06) in Dharmendra Sharma v. Agra Development Authority [Civil Appeal Nos.2809-2810 Of 2024] held that; 

  • In Debashis Sinha v. R.N.R. Enterprise (2023) [(2023) 3 SCC 195], this Court held that possession offered without the requisite completion certificate is illegal, and a purchaser cannot be compelled to take possession in such circumstances.

  • On the other hand, the ADA, despite making an offer of possession in 2014, did not fulfil its statutory obligations by providing the requisite completion certificate and firefighting clearance certificate, both of which are essential for a valid and lawful offer of possession. The absence of these documents, which were also not furnished before the NCDRC, unquestionably vitiates the offer of possession made by the ADA..

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3). SCI (2023.02.09) In Debashis Sinha vs M/s R.N.R Enterprise & Ors. [Civil Appeal Nos. 3343 OF 2020, Neutral Citation 2024 INSC 667] held that;

  • The observation made by the NCDRC of the respondents having successfully argued that it was not their fault, that no completion certificate of the project could be obtained, is clearly contrary to the statutory provisions.

  • It is, therefore, evident on a conjoint reading of sections 403, 390, and 394 of the KMC Act that it is the obligation of the person intending to erect a building or to execute works to apply for completion certificate in terms of the rules framed thereunder. It is no part of the flat owner’s duty to apply for a completion certificate.

  • True it is, the appellants ought not to have taken possession without the completion certificate; however, that was not a valid ground not to direct the respondents to apply for and obtain the completion certificate as required by law.

  • Undoubtedly, they have also been on the wrong side of law by taking possession of their respective flats without the completion certificate, whatever might be the compulsion, we are not inclined to direct the NCDRC to decide on the compensation component.

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Sunday, 16 March 2025

Celir LLP Vs. Bafna Moto (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. - Waiver can be contractual or by express conduct in consideration of some compromise. However, a statutory right may also be waived by implied conduct, like, by wanting to take a chance of a favourable decision. The fact that the other side has acted on it, is sufficient consideration.

 SCI (21.09.2023) In Celir LLP Vs. Bafna Moto (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. [Civil Appeal Nos. 5542 - 5543 of 2023, Neutral Citation 2023 INSC 838] held that;

  • Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Waiver applies when a party knows the material facts and is cognizant of the legal rights in that matter, and yet for some consideration consciously abandons the existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege. 

  • Waiver can be contractual or by express conduct in consideration of some compromise. However, a statutory right may also be waived by implied conduct, like, by wanting to take a chance of a favourable decision. The fact that the other side has acted on it, is sufficient consideration.


Excerpts of the Order;

# 62. It is equally well settled that the rights created for the benefit of the borrower under the SARFAESI  Act, can be waived. Waiver can be contractual or by express conduct in consideration of some  compromise. However, a statutory right may also be waived by implied conduct, like, by wanting to take a chance of a favourable decision. The fact that the other side has acted on it, is sufficient consideration, as observed by this Court in Arce Polymers Pvt. Ltd. v. Alpine Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2022) 2 SCC 221, referred as under: -

  • “16. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Waiver applies when a party knows the material facts and is cognizant of the legal rights in that matter, and yet for some consideration consciously abandons the existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege. Waiver can be contractual or by express conduct in consideration of some compromise. However, a statutory right may also be waived by implied conduct, like, by wanting to take a chance of a favourable decision. The fact that the other side has acted on it, is sufficient consideration.

  • 17. It is correct that waiver being an intentional relinquishment is not to be inferred by mere failure to take auction, but the present case is of repeated positive acts post the notices under Sections 13(2) and (4) of the SARFAESI Act. Not only did the borrower not question or object to the auction of the Bank, but it by express and deliberate conduct had asked the Bank to compromise its position and alter the contractual terms. The borrower wrote repeated request letters for restructuring of loans, which prayers were considered by the Bank by giving indulgence, time and opportunities. The borrower, aware and conscious of its rights,chose to abandon the statutory claim and took its chance and even  procured favourable decisions. Even if we are to assume that the borrower did not waive the remedy, its conduct had put the Bank in a position where they have lost time, and suffered on account of delay and laches, which aspects are material. Auction on the subject property was delayed by more than a year as at the behest of the borrower, the Bank gave them a long rope to regularise the account. To ignore the conduct of the borrower would not be reasonable to the Bank once third-party rights have been created. In this background, the principle of equitable estoppel as a rule of evidence bars the borrower from complaining of violation.” (Emphasis supplied)


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