Imp. Rulings - Statutory Interpretation of Penal Provisions

 Imp. Rulings - Statutory Interpretation of Penal Provisions.

Index;

1. SCI (2025.09.19) in Kaveri Plastics Vs. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul [2025 INSC 1133, Criminal Appeal Nos  . of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 11184 -11185 of 2024)]

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SCI (2025.09.19) in Kaveri Plastics Vs. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul [2025 INSC 1133, Criminal Appeal Nos  . of 2025 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 11184 -11185 of 2024)] held that;

# 6. The interpretation of the words ‘said amount’ in Proviso (b) to Section 138 of the NI Act as above is based on the principle of statutory interpretation that penal statute would always be construed and applied strictly. This Court in M. Narayanan Nambiar vs. State of Kerala [AIR 1963 SC 1116], spoke on the rule of construction of a penal provision in its true perspective by quoting from the  English decision in Dyke vs. Elliott [(1872) 4 PC 184] which was again referred to in a more recent decision of this Court in Balaji Traders vs. State of U.P. & Anr. [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1314,] 

• “A decision of the judicial Committee in Dyke v. Elliot, (1) cited by the learned counsel as an aid for construction neatly states the principle and therefore may be extracted:-

• Lord justice James speaking (1)(1872) L. R. 4 P.C. 184, 191, for the Board observes at P.191:

• “No doubt all penal Statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say, the Court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included if thought of. On the other hand, the person charged has a right to say that the thing charged although within the words, is not within the spirit of the enactment.”” 

6.1 The Privy Council decision in Dyke vs. Elliott (supra) quoted by this Court with approval stated that the court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included if thought of. It was thereafter observed that where the thing is brought within the words and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed, like any other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language used, and the court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute.

6.2 The interpretative canon of strict construction of penal statute was highlighted also in the Craies Statute Law [7th Edn. at p.529] wherein the decision of U.S. v. Wiltberger [18 US 76 (1820)] was referred to observing.

• “The distinction between a strict construction and a more free one has, no doubt, in modern times almost disappeared, and the question now is, what is the true construction of the statute? I should say that in a criminal statute you must be quite sure that the offence charged is within the letter of the law. This rule is said to be founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of  individuals, and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the Legislature, and not in the judicial department, for it is the Legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment.” 

6.3 Having noticed the above principle of construction of penal statute, this Court in Suman Sethi (supra) concluded.

• “ There is no ambiguity or doubt in the language of Section 138. Reading the entire section as a whole and applying common sense, from the words, as stated above, it is clear that the legislature intended that in a notice under clause (b) to the proviso, the demand has to be made for the cheque amount.” (Para 7) 

6.4 The proposition that the penal provision has to be construed strictly was again asserted by this Court in K.K. Ahuja vs. V.K. Vora & Anr. [(2009) 10 SCC 48] In the context of provision of Sections 141 and 138 of the NI Act it was observed in para 17 of the judgment that penal statutes are to be construed strictly and that if conditions are scraped, the courts will insist upon strict literal compliance. It was stated that there is no question of inferential or implied compliance.

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