Dr. Shah Faesal and Ors. vs Union of India and Anr - The two Judge Bench in Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 7] should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been Stated in Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] , a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench.

Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court (2020.03.02)  in Dr. Shah Faesal and Ors. vs Union of India and Anr.[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1099 of 2019] held that;  

• # 18. Doctrine of precedents and stare decisis are the core values of our legal system. They form the tools which further the goal of certainty, stability and continuity in our legal system. Arguably, judges owe a duty to the concept of certainty of law, therefore they often justify their holdings by relying upon the established tenets of law. 

• The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court.”

• The two Judge Bench in Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 7] should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been Stated in Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] , a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench.    (emphasis supplied)

• A judgment of this Court can be distinguished into two parts: ratio decidendi and the obiter dictum. The ratio is the basic essence of the judgment, and the same must be understood in the context of the relevant facts of the case.

• The rule of per incuriam has been developed as an exception to the doctrine of judicial precedent. Literally, it means a judgment passed in ignorance of a relevant statute or any other binding authority

• At the cost of repetition, we note that the rule of per incuriam being an exception to the doctrine of precedents is only applicable to the ratio of the judgment. The same having an impact on the stability of the legal precedents must be applied sparingly, when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the opinions of two coordinate Benches. 

 

Excerpts of the order;

# 17. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has shown that usually the Courts do not overrule the established precedents unless there is a social, constitutional or economic change mandating such a development. The numbers themselves speak of restraint and the value this Court attaches to the doctrine of precedent. The Supreme Court regards the use of precedent as indispensable bedrock upon which this Court renders justice. The use of such precedents, to some extent, creates certainty upon which individuals can rely and conduct their affairs. It also creates a basis for the development of the rule of law. . . . . .

# 18. Doctrine of precedents and stare decisis are the core values of our legal system. They form the tools which further the goal of certainty, stability and continuity in our legal system. Arguably, judges owe a duty to the concept of certainty of law, therefore they often justify their holdings by relying upon the established tenets of law. 

 

# 19. When a decision is rendered by this Court, it acquires a reliance interest and the society organizes itself based on the present legal order. When substantial judicial time and resources are spent on references, the same should not be made in a casual or cavalier manner. It is only when a proposition is contradicted by a subsequent judgment by a Bench of same strength, or it is shown that the proposition laid down has become unworkable or contrary to a well established principle, that a reference will be made to a larger Bench. In this context, a five Judge Bench of this Court in Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234, after considering series of earlier ruling reiterated that 

• “22. … The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court.” (emphasis supplied)

 

# 23. This brings us to the question, as to whether a ruling of a coordinate Bench binds subsequent coordinate Benches. It is now a settled principle of law that the decisions rendered by a coordinate Bench is binding on the subsequent Benches of equal or lesser strength. The aforesaid view is reinforced in the National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 wherein this Court held that:

• 59.1. The two Judge Bench in Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 7] should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been Stated in Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] , a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench.    (emphasis supplied)

# 25. In this line, further enquiry requires us to examine, to what extent does a ruling of coordinate Bench bind the subsequent Bench. A judgment of this Court can be distinguished into two parts: ratio decidendi and the obiter dictum. The ratio is the basic essence of the judgment, and the same must be understood in the context of the relevant facts of the case.

 

# 28. The rule of per incuriam has been developed as an exception to the doctrine of judicial precedent. Literally, it means a judgment passed in ignorance of a relevant statute or any other binding authority [see Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 KB 718 (CA)]. The aforesaid rule is well elucidated in Halsbury's Laws of England in the following manner:

• 1687. … the court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam. A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of a coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords. In the former case it must decide which decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords.     (emphasis supplied)

# 42. First, it is worth highlighting that judgments cannot be interpreted in a vacuum, separate from their facts and context. Observations made in a judgment cannot be selectively picked in order to give them a particular meaning. . . . . . 

46.  . . . . At the cost of repetition, we note that the rule of per incuriam being an exception to the doctrine of precedents is only applicable to the ratio of the judgment. The same having an impact on the stability of the legal precedents must be applied sparingly, when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the opinions of two coordinate Benches. . . . . 

 

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